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ABSTRACT
Humanitarian intervention has long been a secondary or tertiary concern in a
security driven international system. Since NATO’s intervention during the Kosovo
crisis in 1999 there have been significant developments in both the language and
form of humanitarian intervention as a matter of international law. The events in
Kosovo sparked debate about how to handle humanitarian crisis in the future and
thus humanitarian intervention evolved into a redefinition of sovereignty as
responsibility and the Responsibility to Protect. The Responsibility to Protect has
had a number of opportunities to continue to evolve and assert itself in an
international legal context throughout the ensuing years since the Kosovo
intervention.
The purpose of this research is to explore the moral, legal and practical
implications of the Responsibility to Protect doctrine. Classical and contemporary
theories of international relations and moral philosophy are applied in the context
of the Responsibility to Protect and its effect upon the international system and
specific states to cultivate a sense of the development of the norm and different
actors’ attitudes towards it. A literature review is conducted to show the practical
and conceptual issues inherent in the framework of the Responsibility to Protect.
The norm is then applied to the cases of Kosovo, Libya, and Syria to assess its effect
in practice and determine its origins. The analysis of these case studies leads to a
number of conclusions regarding its effectiveness and future application.
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The case studies chosen for this research are Kosovo, Libya, and Syria. The
case of Kosovo helps to establish a humanitarian intervention framework, the need
for redefinition, and the beginning of the Responsibility to Protect. Libya shows the
first strong case for the positive application of the Responsibility to Protect in a
practical sense. The non-intervention in Syria shows the difficult political issues
involved in intervention and presents uncertainty as to the positive development of
the norm. These cases clearly show the myriad of practical challenges to RtoP that
are borne out the theoretical, moral issues embedded in its philosophy.
The conclusion drawn from the literature review and subsequent case
studies is that the current efforts to assert the Responsibility to Protect are aimed at
the wrong areas of international law and states, and that the norm is not developing
positively in a linear pattern. To successfully promote its acceptance the
Responsibility to Protect must build institutional linkages to make intervention
more cost effective, exercise the regional options available to promote and ensure
the legitimacy of intervention, and assure the acceptance of RtoP by the major
powers in the Security Council.
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Chapter 1: Overview
Introduction
The Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) is a conceptual and practical tool
developed by states, international organizations such as the United Nations, and
international law scholars for the purpose of attempting to standardize and clearly
form a comprehensive approach to military and non-military intervention and
engagement with nation-states committing or in danger of committing human rights
abuses at a determined level of severity. In essence, RtoP relies on a redefinition of
sovereignty that differs from the traditional Westphalian concept of sovereignty and
relies on three pillars in order to justify humanitarian intervention from a moral and
legal standpoint. Sovereignty as responsibility attempts to redirect the focus of
sovereignty from classical definitions regarding nonintervention to the
responsibility that rulers or those in power have to protect the lives of their citizens,
and thereby the responsibility that the international community has to protect those
same citizens in lieu of domestic leadership. Central also to this redefinition is the
proposed action plan, which involves prevention, reaction, and rebuilding to enforce
RtoP.
The task that the International Commission on Intervention and State
Sovereignty (ICISS) and the United Nations General Assembly with the support of
the Secretary General have undertaken is a challenging one. Any alteration or
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evolution of established international norms is often contentious and conceptually
problematic. The interested parties have made some interesting progress and
uncovered a number of conceptual, legal, and moral issues with the basic logic of
RtoP and humanitarian intervention. In order to understand these challenges, this
work explores the traditional concepts of sovereignty and places them in
juxtaposition to the attempt at redefinition.
This work outlines these issues and concepts in a logical and intuitive way in
order to foster a deeper understanding of the logic of humanitarian intervention
from an international legal perspective. The first chapter develops an understanding
of the Responsibility to Protect itself as a concept, including a precise definition of
RtoP, discussion of the background of RtoP, the development of humanitarian
intervention, further development of the definitions and concepts important to
RtoP, and brief overview of the main issues and controversies. This initial chapter is
meant to provide a foundation within the realm of international relations upon
which to build the deeper understanding of the issues inherent in the adoption of
RtoP. The second chapter of the study delves into a deeper understanding of RtoP
with particular reference to the conceptual, practical, and theoretical issues laid out
in the first chapter. The second section is concerned largely with the moral and legal
issues and concepts inherent in RtoP and its development as a potential norm in
international law. The chapter explores the challenges presented by RtoP, why they
exist, and how they may be overcome in some cases. Chapter three of the study
examines the current status of RtoP as an international legal concept by looking at
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case studies of some of its most recent applications or evocations in Libya and Syria
preceded by an examination of humanitarian intervention in Kosovo in 1999. The
fourth and final chapter draws some conclusions from the preceding analysis and
suggests some important areas of focus for the development of RtoP. This includes
some feasible approaches and factors to be considered.
The proceeding examination of the Responsibility to Protect is conducted
largely as a literature review with a brief case study to explore practical applications
of the literature. The opinions of the prevailing international legal scholars,
international organizations, and heads of state are essential in providing an
understanding of an international legal norm as complex and contested as the
Responsibility to Protect. The status and development of the norm is reflected
through the bodies of work published by those influential in the field, i.e. those who
are capable of shaping normative developments in international law. The case study
conducted between the Kosovar, Libyan, and Syrian conflicts serves to highlight the
difficulties inherent in applying a concept as nebulous as RtoP and provide further
context for the literature review.
The analysis concludes that there are many operational and moral problems
inherent in the RtoP concept and its application, or lack thereof, to real world
events. The Responsibility to Protect as it currently stands is indeterminate,
ethnocentric, and paternalistic. The means by which the ICISS and some members of
the United Nations are attempting to achieve their goals are ill-formed and based on
a particular worldview applied universally through an organization, the United
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Nations, that is not entirely based upon the equality of its members in practice.
Whether or not this means that the entire Responsibility to Protect doctrine should
be abandoned is a question with a less definite answer. The conclusion in Chapter 4
attempts to address these problems and come up with potential solutions, however
it may come to pass that these issues cannot be resolved to the satisfaction of all
United Nations members states.
Goals
Before beginning any in-depth discussion about the Responsibility to Protect
it is necessary to clarify a number of things with respect to the goals of this study in
order to avoid potential misunderstandings. The purpose of this exploration of the
Responsibility to Protect is not to claim or prove that the inherent goal of RtoP is
morally wrong or misguided – that goal being the prevention of mass murder,
genocide, ethnic cleansing, etc. In fact, as the history shows, those portions of RtoP
are already enshrined in international treaties and conventions (The Geneva
Conventions, and The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, e.g.) and thereby generally accepted as legitimate international law by
and large. I do not wish to question the moral legitimacy of preventing genocide and
crimes and against humanity, merely the mechanisms by which this end is achieved.
The goal of this study, therefore, is to engender a deeper understanding of
the function and logic of applying a decidedly Universalist norm like RtoP and the
issues created thereby in order to assess its affect upon the behavior of nationstates (referred to elsewhere as “compliance-pull”). The potential issues related to
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RtoP are that it brings with it a number of assumptions and inferences about global
society and Western civilization in general that can be problematic for certain
perspectives – these inferences may reflect the privileged position of the powerful,
Western societies that have the most sway within international decision making
bodies like the United Nations. This study shows that many of the values and
theoretical foundations of RtoP are distinctly ethnocentric, as are some of the
mechanisms for enforcing it. It is also the attempt to redefine the age-old principle
of sovereignty that is problematic – the Commission asserts their redefinition as
though it is fact, without much discussion to support it. These issues may negatively
affect the adoption of RtoP norms and thereby hinder the underlying goal. It is my
hope that exposure of these issues to critical analysis will reveal other paths.
Furthermore, a fair amount of the controversy surrounding RtoP is the
tension between the sometimes ideologically opposed and geographically split
Permanent Five (P5) members of the Security Council – namely, Russia and China as
one bloc and the United States, France, and the United Kingdom as another. There is
no dearth of academic literature and analysis that shows the potentially problematic
divide between members of the P5 and the possibility of a veto effectively blocking
UN Security Council action in a case that may call for the RtoP framework to be
asserted and an intervention carried out. Although there are almost certainly vital
state interests besides RtoP at stake in these situations (the case of Syria, for
example, will be examined later), the lack of application of the RtoP principle in
certain cases serves to highlight this ideological divide between great powers and
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members of the P5 regarding the normative conflict between sovereignty, nonintervention, and human security.
It is the ideological content of RtoP that this study addresses, i.e. the
mechanisms by which a universal morality is asserted by a certain grouping of state
and non-state actors and what those mechanisms reflect not only about the morality
itself but those who assert it so vigorously. The fact that this ideological split, shown
both in the Security Council and generally abroad, can be demonstrated through the
literature on RtoP serves to highlight the goals of this study, which is merely to
question the normative status of concepts that are generally considered to be
“good,” like humanitarian intervention. Keeping these goals in mind, this study
proceeds with an examination of the history of humanitarian intervention.
History of Humanitarian Intervention and RtoP
It goes without saying that the evolution of human protection and intervention
has a long history that reaches back through centuries of human development1.
However, for the purposes of this study of the responsibility to protect, we begin our
analysis of human protection and humanitarian intervention with the Geneva
Conventions in 1949. As Elizabeth Ferris writes, “After World War II, international
human rights law developed as a cornerstone of the new international order” (2011,
6). So although the concept of human rights and human protection certainly existed
1Elizabeth

Ferris claims, “Modern humanitarianism is generally dated to the midnineteenth century, when a remarkable reform movement grew up in Europe and
North America” (2011, 8). She also writes at length about the humanitarian
principles inherent in Islam. She places the start of international humanitarian law
at the 1864 Geneva Convention.
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before 1949, the humanitarian developments that came out of World War II are
most instructive for our purposes here. Most succinctly, humanitarian intervention
is defined as, “the threat or use of force across state borders by a state (or group of
states) aimed at preventing or ending widespread and grave violations of
fundamental human rights of persons other than the nationals of the intervening
state and without the permission of the state within which force is applied” (Farer,
Archibugi, Brown, Crawford, Weiss and Wheeler. 2005, 212). Some examples of
humanitarian interventions between 1949 and the early 1990’s are India in East
Pakistan in 1971, Vietnam in Cambodia in 1978, Tanzania in Uganda in 1979.
According to Thakur (2009) these Cold War era interventions were rife with
humanitarian rhetoric and “pseudo interventions.” In other words, many of these
interventions were politically dubious and carried out in an ad hoc manner. The
Post-War period was one in which the primary international body for making
determinations leading to humanitarian interventions, the United Nations Security
Council, was effectively frozen by ideological differences.
The Responsibility to Protect began in the 1990’s with a surge in the
frequency of international humanitarian interventions after the end of the Cold War
tensions that largely froze multilateral action in the United Nations Security Council
due to indulgent use of the veto and other ideological issues (Nahory 2004).
Examples of the most prominent 1990’s interventions are those that occurred in
Somalia, Kosovo, and Rwanda, many of which are widely considered to be failures.
However, it was the relative failure of these operations to halt or prevent abuses
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effectively that led to the formulation of RtoP. As Ekkehard Strauss notes, “the
responsibility to protect was developed as a response to the lack of Security Council
action regarding the situation in Kosovo that generated more general debate about
the gap between legality and legitimacy” (2010, 46). It was in the wake of Security
Council immobilization due to ideology and failed attempts to conduct humanitarian
intervention operations that a need for something new surfaced.
In The Oxford Handbook on the United Nations Ramesh Thakur (2009)
highlights one of the fundamental differences between humanitarian intervention
and the Responsibility to Protect. This difference is shown most clearly in how the
debate over each concept is carried out. Thakur writes in “Humanitarian
Intervention,” “The first debate, by pointing to possible justification for intervention
outside the UN framework, concentrated on developing and amplifying the
exception to the rule. The second seeks to elaborate a new rule that itself justifies
and may require international intervention” (2009, 2). This distinction is paramount
to the discussion – with this refocusing of the debate the question now centers on
how, why, and when we may use the UN to carry out humanitarian intervention
legally and effectively, whereas previously the question was how to carry out
humanitarian intervention outside the UN framework because the intervention
violated a well-established United Nations principle – sovereignty. Humanitarian
intervention outside of the UN is shown in the case study on Kosovo in Chapter 3.
Since then humanitarian intervention has attempted to move from an exception to
the rule to the formation of a rule in and of itself. Reframing the argument in favor of
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a responsibility to protect as opposed to humanitarian intervention also allows
proponents to focus on aspects other than the intervention piece which is explicitly
implied as the end-goal, these other aspects being the prevention and rebuilding
pieces of RtoP. In contrast to humanitarian intervention, R2P “provides conceptual,
normative and operational linkages between assistance, intervention and
reconstruction” (Thakur 2009, 13). The language of RtoP is meant to shift focus
directly towards the populations in need of assistance and develop effective routes
for providing that assistance.
In 1999, then Secretary General of the United Nations Kofi Annan expressed
his thoughts on the current state of humanitarian intervention and the
responsibility to protect. Kofi Annan’s goal was to attempt to reach some kind of
consensus on the ill-defined concept of humanitarian intervention in order to more
effectively prevent atrocities like the Rwandan Genocide (Badescu and Bergholm
2009). Subsequently the International Commission on Intervention and State
Sovereignty was established and their report published in 2001 was titled The
Responsibility to Protect. This became the premier referential document for the
Responsibility to Protect concept. The report addresses the normative conflicts
presented by humanitarian intervention and state sovereignty. As legal precedent to
the Responsibility to Protect the ICISS Document cites the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights; the four Geneva Conventions and the two Additional Protocols on
international humanitarian law in armed conflict; the 1948 Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide; the two 1966 Covenants
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relating to civil, political, social, economic and cultural rights; and the adoption in
1998 of the statute for the establishment of an International Criminal Court. Some
tenets of the 2001 ICISS Report was officially endorsed by the United Nations
General Assembly in what is generally referred to as the 2005 Outcome Document.
In paragraphs 138 and 139 the General Assembly affirms the ICISS’s assertion that
individual states are responsible for protecting their populations from genocide,
war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity and that the international
community, through the United Nations, also has a responsibility to protect
populations from the same crimes (U. N. General Assembly 2005). This second
responsibility is the central tenet of RtoP. In 2006 the Security Council reaffirmed
the conclusions reached by the General Assembly in paragraphs 138 and 139 of the
Outcome Document by passing Resolution 1674 (U. N. Security Council 2006).
It was at this time that the concept or RtoP began to separate itself
conceptually from the concept of humanitarian intervention. Kofi Annan, the former
Secretary General of the United Nations, began to push for a different agenda;
“Under the impact of the two contrasting experiences of Rwanda and Kosovo, Annan
urged member states to come up with a new consensus on the competing visions of
national and popular sovereignty and the resulting ‘challenge of humanitarian
intervention’” (Thakur 2009, 12). There was a realization by Annan and other
members of the international community that humanitarian intervention could
work in theory, and that the international community required some kind of
framework for it to work effectively – this became the Secretary General’s goal.
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In 2004 before the outright acceptance of RtoP principles in the Outcome
Document, in A More Secure World, the General Assembly affirms, “There is a
growing recognition that the issue is not the ‘right to intervene’ of any State, but the
‘responsibility to protect’ of every State when it comes to people suffering from
avoidable catastrophe” (U. N. General Assembly 2004, 56). The General Assembly
also endorses a “collective international responsibility to protect” as an “emerging
norm,” and references the Security Council as the legitimate body through which to
act in reference to RtoP. This endorsement and recognition of an emerging norm
eventually led to the resolution that was the 2005 Outcome Document. There were
some roadblocks on the way to RtoP’s iteration in the 2005 Outcome Document. As
one might expect, the document itself went through a number of revisions. On
August 5 UNGA President Jean Ping presented a revised draft, wherein the
document “limited the scope” of RtoP with respect to the triggering mechanisms for
its enforcement (genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against
humanity) and “They acknowledged that the international community, through the
United Nations, also had the ‘obligation’ – changed from ‘responsibility’ – to use […]
peaceful means” in cases where RtoP enforcement may apply (Strauss 2010, 30).
Here the second pillar of RtoP is referred to as an obligation of states to act as
opposed to merely a responsibility or permissive norm that allows them to act if
they wish.
The United States had some key reservations to the resolution. As Strauss
writes, “The United States requested, inter alia, to drop the reference to incitement
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and change the wording back to ‘responsibility’ when describing the role of the
international community” (2010, 30). Although incitement2 made it into the final
document, any mention of obligation to the international community is omitted. The
language of the final document also changes the “unwilling and unable” to protect
their populations in triggering the third pillar of RtoP to “manifestly fails,” which is
arguably less subjective than the former and sets the bar for intervention a bit
higher. Strauss notes that countries “questioned who could determine legally that a
member state was ‘unwilling and unable’ to protect their populations” (Strauss
2010, 32). Manifest failure, however, may be easier to determine. The proceeding
examination shows that the hesitance to use strong language in reference to
humanitarian intervention triggers, especially by the U.S. and other great powers,
continues to be a problem as the norm evolves.
The Responsibility to Protect is now considered part of the lexicon of
international relations and has effectively replaced humanitarian intervention,
though the latter is still sometimes referred to with negative connotations. The
evolution from humanitarian intervention to a responsibility to protect shifts the
focus of the debate and attempts to redefine a concept central to international
relations. One of the most important aspects of the redefinition is the focus on the
recipients of aid and their protection as opposed to potential violations of

Wording from the Outcome Document: “This responsibility entails the prevention
of such crimes, including their incitement, through appropriate and necessary means
[emphasis mine]” (U. N. General Assembly 2005, 31).
2
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sovereignty. The more recent history of RtoP and its applications is addressed more
in depth in the third chapter on the Libyan and Syrian civil wars.
Defining the Responsibility to Protect
It is important here to attempt a definition of exactly what it is the
Responsibility to Protect is attempting to do or accomplish. This is done by
exploring the main tenets of RtoP as they are presented in the ICISS report and
other official documentation from the United Nations as well as analysis of those
works from international legal scholars. In defining the Responsibility to Protect as
accurately as possible we may then explore the central issues presented by its
implementation with a fuller understanding of their impact. As addressed later in
the work, some of the concepts contained within RtoP are difficult to define or
determine. As a result, this section on defining RtoP refers mainly to the core texts
that introduce and affirm it, i.e. the 2001 ICISS Report and subsequent United
Nations resolutions. This is done in an attempt to present RtoP as what
international organizations are trying to accomplish, not exactly what is being done.
The Basic Principles of the Responsibility to Protect are outlined by the
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty in the 2001
document The Responsibility to Protect. Summarized, the basic principle of RtoP is,
“Where a population is suffering serious harm, as a result of internal war,
insurgency, repression or state failure, and the state in question is unwilling or
unable to halt or avert it, the principle of non-intervention yields to the
international responsibility to protect” (ICISS 2001, XI). What the ICISS is essentially
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saying here is that states are responsible as sovereigns for the protection of their
citizens (indeed, this responsibility is a prerequisite for sovereignty) and that any
failure of this responsibility allows the international community to intervene in
order to facilitate said protection, even against the wishes of the sovereign who has
allegedly failed said responsibility. As succinctly stated by Badescu and Bergholm,
The central normative tenet of R2P is that state sovereignty entails
responsibility and, therefore, each state has a responsibility to protect its
citizens from mass killings and other gross violations of their rights.
However, if a state is unable or unwilling to carry out that function, the state
abrogates its sovereignty, and the responsibility to protect devolves onto
international actors. (2009, 288)
These concepts are also known as the Three Pillars of the Responsibility to
Protect. The first pillar is the responsibility of the sovereign powers to their own
populations, the second is the responsibility to the international community to
enforce or support the fulfillment of this responsibility if need be, and the third is
potentially the permission to employ coercive measures up to and including military
intervention in order to assure that these responsibilities are being met.
The 2005 Outcome document penned by the United Nations General
Assembly reaffirms the ICISS concepts;
Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. This
responsibility entails the prevention of such crimes, including their
incitement, through appropriate and necessary means. We accept that
responsibility and will act in accordance with it. (United Nations 2005)
The document goes on to state that Chapter VII enforcement by the Security Council
is a viable option in these circumstances. The first pillar is the acknowledgement of
the responsibility of sovereigns to protect their own populations, the second is a
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statement that the international community may help nations to fulfill said
responsibility, and the third pillar states generally that if a state manifestly fails in
its responsibilities to protect, the international community has the responsibility to
use coercive measures such as sanctions and military intervention. Simply stated,
the principle characteristics of RtoP are that 1) civilian protection is an international
concern, 2) military force is a viable option for policing this concern, 3) regional
arrangements may be effective in this enforcement and 4) The United Nations
Security Council is the most legitimate body through which to achieve this military
civilian protection (Bellamy 2011).
The ICISS is attempting to redefine sovereignty; therefore it is prudent here
to examine what it is that they are changing it to as part of our definition. The
concept of sovereignty as a legal principle in international law extends back to the
1648 Peace of Westphalia. The peace established for the first time external political
boundaries and established the concept of a sovereign’s internal jurisdiction over
their population. The concept of sovereignty is generally considered to be enshrined
in Article 2 (7) of the United Nations Charter, which states, “Nothing contained in
the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which
are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state” (United Nations 1945),
but provides exceptions under Chapter VII of the Charter which concerns sanctions
and military actions. What is “essentially” within in the domestic jurisdiction of a
state has never been precisely defined, however Article 2 provides a guide post for
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navigating through the difficult business of ensuring international peace and
security.
Westphalian sovereignty is not the only kind of sovereignty, however.
Stephen Krasner’s Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (1999) outlines four different
types of interrelated sovereignty; international legal, interdependence, domestic,
and Westphalian. International legal sovereignty is established by mutual
recognition of statehood between states and their capacity to act as states.
Interdependence sovereignty refers to the ability of states to regulate cross border
trade and globalization. Domestic sovereignty is perhaps the most widely-known
concept, and refers to internal political authority structures and how those
authorities exercise effective control within their own border. Finally, Westphalian
sovereignty is based on two principles; “territoriality and the exclusion of external
actors from domestic authority structures” (Krasner 1999, 4-20). Domestic and
Westphalian sovereignty are the concepts most relevant to our discussion of
sovereignty here. The Commission and the Responsibility to Protect are attempting
to redefine the concept of sovereignty in a way that diminishes the effect or
absoluteness of domestic and Westphalian sovereignty.
With respect to the Responsibility to Protect’s definition of sovereignty, the
Commission states, “There is no transfer or dilution of state sovereignty. But there is
a necessary re-characterization involved: from sovereignty as control to sovereignty
as responsibility in both internal functions and external duties” (ICISS 2001, 12).
This is perhaps the most precise description of what RtoP is attempting to
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accomplish vis-à-vis sovereignty. According to the ICISS definition a prerequisite of
sovereign authority is the ability, actual or potential, of that sovereign to protect
their populations from atrocities such a war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and genocide.
This protection entails not only shielding one’s population from outside forces that
my commit these crimes, but also internal forces, whether those be in the
government itself or some kind of paramilitary organization within the country’s
borders.
With respect to the severity or triggers for RtoP the ICISS Document
provides, “large scale loss of life” or “ethnic cleansing,” that is “occurring or
imminent.” As a more general description they provide cases of “conscienceshocking situations crying out for action” (ICISS 2001, XIII). These situations
generally cover the conventions and protocols against genocide, ethnic cleansing,
crimes against humanity, and war crimes. More in-depth discussion of these terms
and situations is not provided within the document except for further references to
well-established international norms against genocide and ethnic cleansing. In this
sense RtoP provides an impetus for action only in “obvious” cases of abuse such as is
already covered by the existing treaties and conventions against genocide, etc.
Furthermore, there is no in-depth discussion of what qualifies as “imminent,”
though subsequent scholarly analysis of the issue has attempted to clarify this as is
explored subsequently in this study. Ideally, continued application of the norm will
help to clarify these concepts.
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On the subject of a legal threshold for determining legitimate intervention
the Commission adheres largely to Just War theory principles – “in the
Commission’s judgement all the relevant decision making criteria can be succinctly
summarized under the following six headings: right authority, just cause, right
intention, last resort, proportional means and reasonable prospects” (ICISS 2001, 32).
These headings are all part of the jus ad bellum tradition of Just War theory, i.e. the
internationally accepted guidelines by which nations justify the resort to armed
conflict. To expand briefly, right authority requires that the declaration of war, as it
were, comes from a legitimate source, in this case the United Nations Security
Council. Just cause and right intention require that the purpose of the military action
be very narrowly and specifically defined, in this case with the goal of ending or
preventing atrocities and supporting the responsibility to protect of the sovereign
state as opposed to securing power in the region or bringing about a change in
leadership. The last resort principle requires that all other avenues have been
explored and attempted, i.e. Chapter VI Security Council mechanisms on the pacific
settlements of disputes. Proportional means requires that the response be just
severe enough to halt the atrocities, and should not cause undue stress or long-term
injury. Reasonable prospects simply means that the intervening force must have a
reasonable chance of succeeding at their objective. In addition to these principles,
Brunstetter and Braun suggest that we also consider the probability of escalation as
a valid Just War principle in their work on applications of small-scale force (2013,
98) such as we might see in RtoP operations. This essentially means that we must
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consider what affect the intervention will have upon the level of violence being
committed. For example, atrocities may ramp up as outside military intervention
draws near in a last ditch effort of sorts, as some have argued they did after NATO
began their operation in Kosovo.
Theoretical Perspectives
Before going further into the discussion of the moral issues created by RtoP it
is necessary to provide some background context on some of the prevailing
theoretical foundations of international relations, philosophy and ethics. This
exposition, along with our definition of RtoP, will help ground the proceeding
examination of issues in Chapter 2. It would be very possible to pen an entire work
on these theories alone (indeed, many have), however that is beyond the scope of
this work. This section is meant to provide a brief but as comprehensive as possible
overview of the logic central to some international relations theories in order to give
context to the RtoP discussion. This work concerns itself mainly with the moral
quality of RtoP in this regard and the source of morality from a philosophical
perspective. What follows is a review of Chris Brown’s International Relations
Theory (1992) and some other core texts on the central tenets of cosmopolitan and
communitarian theory. Brown’s work provides us with a brief overview of the
theoretical perspectives that inform our discussion of RtoP and humanitarian
intervention in international law.
The central tenets of the cosmopolitan theory of international relations are
based largely on the works of Immanuel Kant and his categorical imperative. Kant’s
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categorical imperative is a set of guidelines that attempt to explain the way in which
universal morality functions. Simply stated, the categorical imperative as laid out in
Kant’s 1785 work Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals relies on three
formulations. The first is that one should act only in such a way that they would
wish their actions to become a universal law. The second formulation stipulates that
human beings are to be treated not as a means to an end but an end in and of
themselves. The third formulation simply states, taking into account the first two
maxims; every rational being should “Act in accordance with maxims of a
universally legislative member for a merely possible realm of ends” (Kant 2002: 37,
46, 56). In other words, everyone who possesses the ability to reason should always
act as a “legislating member” of the possible universal kingdom of ends. This
extends to an international legal context in a fairly intuitive way. It ascribes a certain
rational mode of behavior to every human being by their very virtue of being
human, and that behavior necessarily extends outward to all people everywhere.
The cosmopolitan tradition has continued throughout the centuries and finds some
of its modern iterations in the works of Charles Beitz (1979), who adapts John
Rawls’ (1971) concept of justice and fairness, and Daniel Archibugi and David Held
(1995). All of these philosophical works are built upon the premise that morality is
universal in nature as opposed to relative.
The communitarian theories of international relations differ in a number of
fundamental ways. According to Brown, the communitarian perspective differs from
cosmopolitanism in that it attempts “to deepen an understanding of communal and
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social solidarity rather than theorise the relationship between the individual and
humankind,” and furthermore, “The root notion of communitarian thought is that
value stems from the community, the individual finds meaning in life by virtue of his
or her membership in a political community” (1992, 55). In the context of this
construction the individual’s relationship to humanity as a whole, and thereby
universal norms or concepts regarding the human security or freedom that Kant has
laid out for us, is less important or less figural than the individual’s relationship to
their community from which they derive their moral and ethical concepts, and
thereby their sense of self.
Michael Walzer explains this concept further with respect to the conception
of morality in Thick and Thin (1994). Cosmopolitan morality comes from the topdown, i.e. the Kantian ideal of universal application of the kingdom of ends. In this
sense morality is understood and shared by all members of the kingdom of ends, i.e.
the kingdom of humanity. The communitarian concept of morality is more grounded
in contextual factors and believes that morality is established within a community
first and then exported, so to speak. Walzer criticizes the universal application of
morality and value systems with an illustrative metaphor;
When full-grown democrats imagine that the rules of discursive engagement
are the generative rules of morality in all its kinds, they are very much like an
oak tree that, endowed with speech and encouraged to speak freely, solemnly
declares the acorn to be the seed and source of the entire forest. But this at
least suggests a certain generosity. What is perhaps a better analogue would
be provided by an oak tree that acknowledged the full range or arboreal
difference and then argued for the cutting down of all those trees, now called
illegitimate, that did not begin as acorns. (1994, 13)
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These maximalists as Walzer refers to them want to say that the end result (in this
case the assertion of a universal moral principle like RtoP) was guided from the
beginning by a particular set of ideals, whereas Walzer believes history will show
that it only developed slowly over time through a confluence of numerous factors
and actions, etc. – this is the oak tree metaphor brought to light. Furthermore,
Universalist morality, in asserting its place in a hierarchy of morality, is declaring
other viewpoints illegitimate and calling for them to be “cut down” because they do
not serve the ends of cosmopolitanism.
According to Hegel, the separation of community and the individual is not
only conceptually ill-advised, but actually impossible. He writes that it is not
possible “to think of individuals […] in isolation from the community that has
shaped them and constituted them as individuals” (Brown 1992, 62). In this sense it
is only because of our upbringing in a modern, Western society that we have the
privilege believe in a universal, cosmopolitan morality possessed by all. Johann
Herder, as quoted in Brown, writes, “The individual is not prior to culture – as the
Kantian position would seem to assume – but shaped by it” (1992, 59).
Furthermore, Herder asserts that culture cannot be consciously created, and
collective political identities are found in shared common culture, not sovereignty.
Brown also notes that Herder was a staunch pluralist who did not believe in the
superiority or hierarchy of any given culture. According to Brown, “his argument is
that all peoples have something to offer, their own distinctive contribution to the
human family” (72). This formulation is very uniquely constituted to stand in
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opposition to the cosmopolitan concepts advanced by Kant and others. In this
context any global society that exists is part and parcel formed by the amalgamation
of distinct political units and/or communities through their contributions to the
“human family.” Though there may be something to gain by bestowing democratic
ideals upon other nations in order to make them more peaceful in accordance with
our Western conceptions of goodness and morality, these concepts stated by Herder
through Brown tell us that there is also something to be lost by replacing the ideals
and values of other communities with our own because we view them to be more
beneficial.
Not only does the theoretical cosmopolitan ethicist not agree with the
assertion that community is the source of values and morality, they believe that
alienation from the state or community is a precondition for freedom3 (57). What
this approach assumes, in opposition to communitarian perspectives, is that the
concept of “freedom” or “good will” is not derived from the community itself but
they are concepts that exist within all human beings by nature of their humanity and
reason, ergo it is derived from the top-down as opposed to the bottom-up and it is
the separation from their restrictive or biased communities that allows one to fully
realize these universal ideals and concepts for themselves. In this context a
separation from community is devoid of negative connotations as it theoretically
provides the means by which humans may achieve their freedom as autonomous
beings and not means to an end.
Freedom being “moral autonomy for Kant, a free run for the ‘passions’ for Hume”
(Brown 1992).
3
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For Kant, however, it is man’s inability to achieve the kingdom of ends in the
third formulation the leads to these separate political communities in the first place.
Brown writes, "From a Kantian perspective, it is the inability of man to achieve on
earth the universal kingdom of ends required by the third formulation of the
categorical imperative, an inability stemming from the radical evil in man's nature,
that legitimates the existing structure of separate political communities" (1992, 52).
According to the Kantian conception, we may however be morally justified in
ridding the world of despotism in order to allow all citizens their freedom to not be
treated as means to an end. However, war is in and of itself a great hindrance to this
freedom and should be halted wherever and whenever possible.
The logic of Responsibility to Protect is undoubtedly based on cosmopolitan
ideals, as it ascribes certain fundamental human rights to all people everywhere
simply because they are a member of humanity. This is reflected clearly in the
language and meaning of RtoP. The conceptual roots of RtoP are “cosmopolitan […]
restrained, or shall we say softened, by the traditional liberal focus on individual
rights expressed in the categorical imperatives of first-generation human rights
documents and their counterparts in the separately evolved humanitarian law of
war” (Farer et. al. 2005, 215). RtoP bases its argument on the presumption that all
humans everywhere are accorded certain inalienable rights by their very status as
human beings, and it is the responsibility to every sovereign state to ensure that
these rights are respected.
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The very existence of an international body like the United Nations is also in
line with cosmopolitan theory. Brown writes, "a constitution based on the
cosmopolitan right in so far as individuals and states, coexisiting in an external
relationship of mutual influences, may be regarded as citizens of a universal state of
mankind (ius cosmopoliticum)" (1992, 35-6). One could conceive of the United
Nations Charter and the various Conventions as an international constitution based
on cosmopolitan ideals wherein the states themselves are citizens of this “universal
state of mankind.” This potentially gives the United Nations the legitimacy and
authority to legislate the universal kingdom of ends from a cosmopolitan viewpoint.
The conflict between these two ideals is oftentimes where we find arguments
over the Responsibility to Protect. The Kantian ideal of cosmopolitanism and
universal morality clashes with the communitarian concept that ideals and morality
are derived from communities and therefore valid in their own way within the
community. What RtoP does (whether intentionally or not) by using universal
morality is to assert the validity or supremacy of one community ideal over another,
and asserts that that community is the largest one, i.e. humanity. Many aspects of
RtoP require the coercive assertion of universal norms of morality upon discrete
political communities across the world. Even though proponents sometimes address
these concerns, they do not often lament them. By building their argument for
prevention upon the foundation of a universal value system the cosmopolitan RtoP
proponents infer the superiority of their value system which then necessarily
replaces the value system of the communities upon which they plan to enforce their
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universal morality. In this sense the potential destruction of community values and
cultures as a byproduct of atrocity prevention can be seen as a necessary casualty in
the battle for the acceptance of the Responsibility to Protect.
Norm Development
The evaluation of RtoP requires a discussion of how norms develop in
international law from a theoretical and practical perspective. Some of most
important milestones for analyzing the development of RtoP as a norm are Rwanda
as a case study, the African Union Constitutive Act of 2000, NATO in the 1999
Kosovo operation, the ICISS Document, The High Level Panel on Threats and
Challenges in 2004 aka A More Secure World, the Summit Outcome Document in
2005, and Security Council Resolution 1674 (2006). What follows is a discussion of
what international legal norms are, how they develop, and how the Responsibility to
Protect has progressed in this context. From this understanding we may correctly
assess and measure how and in what direction RtoP is moving.
The ultimate object of a norm in international law is to regulate state
behavior (Vranes 2006). The goal here is to evaluate the extent to which, if at all,
RtoP regulates state behavior and in what way. Alex Bellamy defines a norm as
“shared expectations of appropriate behavior for actors with a given identity”
(2010, 160). In the present context the shared expectation is that sovereign states
will behave a certain way or within certain limits towards their populations and that
if they do not then other actors may step in to fulfill this responsibility. The actors
with a given identity are member-states of the United Nations by a narrow
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definition, and all nation-states in the international community of states by a much
broader, cosmopolitan definition. Bellamy expands upon this concept further with
direct reference to RtoP;
The test of whether pillars two and three are properly called norms is the
extent to which there is a shared expectation that 1) governments and
international organizations will exercise this responsibility, that 2) they
recognize a duty and right to do so, and that 3) failure to act will attract
criticism from the society of states. (2010, 161)
The failure to act piece of Bellamy’s quote is an interesting one that is difficult to
determine. Bellamy goes on to state that the indeterminate nature4 of the second
and third pillars of RtoP weakens its “compliance-pull,” and thereby the shared
expectations. Essentially what is at issue here is that there are no hard and fast rules
for the execution of the second and third pillars, thereby making enforcement
nebulous and vague, effectively clouding the determination of its normative power
to influence behavior.
Brunneé and Toope (2011) take an interactional view of normative
development in international law. This view is built upon the premise that norms
are accepted through social practice, shared understandings, adherence to specific
criteria of legality (generality, non-retroactivity, clarity, etc.), and the ability of the
norm to meet legal requirements. Essentially, “legal norms arise when shared
normative understandings evolve to meet the criteria of legality, and become
embedded in the practice of legality” (71). Taking these criteria into consideration,
Brunneé and Toope direct their analysis towards the Responsibility to Protect and
4

I.e. there is a lack of specific prescriptions or applications of the norm in practice.
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ultimately conclude that the norm falls short on the legality criteria of “generality,
clarity, consistency, and constancy over time,” and “inconsistent practice” (2011,
79). This conclusion echoes Bellamy’s assertion that the second and third pillars of
RtoP suffer from the problem of indeterminacy.
In The Oxford Handbook on the United Nations, José Alvarez (2009) makes the
assertion that the study of international law has come to resemble the study of
national law, in that it applies game theoretic and principle-agent approaches to
support his claim. To Alvarez this suggests something significant about the nature of
international law and its relationship to states and state authority. Alvarez believes
that interaction between organs of the UN itself has helped define concepts relevant
to international law; “If, for example, it is not longer acceptable for states to claim
that scrutiny over how they treat their own nationals interferes with their
‘sovereignty,’ this has been established, at least in part, by innumerable examples of
the rejection of such arguments by the General Assembly” (2009, 6). Though
instructive and insightful, this statement may be to general or non-specific, and may
not allow us to evaluate alternative reasons or motives for said rejection. It does,
however, allow us to examine a possible mechanism by which norms are evaluated
and legitimized in the UN and across its member states.
In his study of the assumed legal nature of RtoP, Ekkehard Strauss writes, “no
new collective legal obligation has been created [by RtoP]. Instead, the
responsibility offers an opportunity to improve the implementation of existing legal
norms” (Strauss 2010, 25). Strauss points out that while RtoP may not be asserting a

29
new international norm it may provide a mechanisms by which we may more
effectively carry out and enforce the existing norms (this is addressed further in the
final section on Current Perspectives). Strauss also notes in his study’s conclusion
that opinion juris5 may solidify the responsibility as a legal norm over time as more
and more legal scholars and international legal bodies like the ICJ make rulings on
its enforcement and countries believe they are obliged to enforce it. RtoP in this
sense is not meant to provide a new norm, per se, but to enhance the effectiveness
of preexisting laws and norms through a redefinition of what sovereignty has
become (which brings with it its own set of problems as is shown later in the work).
The Commission believes they have found a norm – that is, the norm that
states are not allowed to do whatever they please to and with their populations
whilst hiding behind the shield of sovereignty. This norm is perhaps demonstrable
to a certain degree – it can be shown by the various Conventions and Protocols that
certain acts when perpetrated by states trigger certain erga omnes obligations. Erga
omnes refers to an obligation that a state has towards the entire international
community. The Commission then claims, “This basic consensus implies that the
international community has a responsibility to act decisively when states are
unwilling or unable to fulfill these basic responsibilities [emphasis mine]” (75). It
would be correct to say that the ICISS in this document has successfully explained
“Opinio juris denotes a subjective obligation, a sense on behalf of a state that it is
bound to the law in question. See ICJ Statute, Article 38(1)(b) (the custom to be
applied must be ‘accepted as law’). Whether the practice of a state is due to a
belief that it is legally obliged to do a particular act is difficult to prove objectively”
(Legal Information Institute 2014).
5
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what the crime is and convinced us that it is, indeed, a crime according to
international law. This is demonstrated by precedent on atrocities like genocide and
the general evolution of sovereignty norms over time. However, they have not, as
they claim, successfully convinced us what the mechanisms for preventing and/or
punishing that crime should be, nor who is responsible for carrying out said
measures if and when it is decided that they are necessary. They have also not been
convincing that sovereignty has been successfully redefined through these
normative developments, but merely that some responsibilities may exist. The
Commission has certainly offered suggestions and opinions; however their assertion
of the normative status of this responsibility is premature.
The international community has shown some hesitation in accepting the
Responsibility to Protect as an international legal norm. This hesitance is reflected
in the language of Resolutions and manner of discussion surrounding military
actions and humanitarian interventions worldwide. As Bellamy notes, “a paragraph
indirectly referring to RtoP was deleted from a draft of Resolution 1769 (2007) on
Darfur; and Resolution 1814 (2008) on Somalia pointedly referred to the protection
of civilians and Resolution 1674 without referring to RtoP” (2010, 145). The
removal of RtoP language from resolution drafts and the purposeful avoidance of
evoking RtoP imply that at least a portion of the international community wishes to
avoid legitimizing and normalizing RtoP as an international legal principle. There
are a number of proposed reasons for this observable behavior, which is explored
more in depth throughout the work. Whatever the actual reason, observation
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strongly suggests that many nations are reluctant to see the positive normative
development of RtoP or at least development of its compliance-pull.
Responsibility to Protect norms involve more than just the consideration of
direct military intervention or even just the actions of states and international
organizations. The association with RtoP should also be preventative diplomacy and
norm adoption as opposed to military action (Bellamy 2010). Bellamy further
suggests that there is a kind of constructive norm adoption occurring at the national
level and with leaders that makes committing atrocities less of an option or less
present for world leaders, insurgents, rebels, etc. This is partially shown by a
decrease in atrocities without a decrease in atrocity-associated conflicts, i.e. the
situations that historically have given rise to atrocities continue to occur, however
the atrocities themselves do not, or at least occur less frequently. He also admits
that it is “impossible” to draw a direct causal connection between the cooling down
of atrocities in the world and the development of R2P as a norm. Despite the
existence of this direct causal connection, Bellamy believes this shows “active
belligerents are more often choosing not to commit atrocities” (2010, 164). If this is
true it suggests some international actors, even if not states, are altering their
behavior based on a shared expectation, thereby suggesting a level of compliancepull.
In what is perhaps a more accurate sentiment, Bellamy concludes in his 2013
paper that “the presumption of non-interference has given way to a presumption of
‘non-indifference’ in the face of genocide and mass atrocities” (352). This is an
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incredibly accurate way to state the effect of RtoP as a developing norm. The
Responsibility to Protect may not facilitate or require action in the way that some
scholars and international actors want it to, but it has definitely facilitated a culture
of “non-indifference.” Chesterman also refers to this concept, but in a slightly
different way when he writes, “the true significance of RtoP is not in creating new
rights or obligations to do ‘the right thing’; rather, it is in making it harder to do the
wrong thing or nothing at all” (2011, 8). This implies that one of RtoP’s principle
functions may be to punish inaction by the responsible states or international
bodies as opposed to just attempting to force action by states, e.g. diplomatic
pressure against indifference. Furthermore, Bellamy believes that the Libyan
intervention characterizes this related norm of non-interference quite well. He
writes, “Council members that remained sceptical [sic] about the use of force
abstained because they believed that they could not legitimize inaction in the face of
mass atrocities” (Bellamy 2011, 844). In other words, they may not themselves have
felt a responsibility or obligation to act, but they also did not stop others from acting
to prevent the potential abuses in Libya even though they could have exercised their
use of the veto to do so. Though instructive for norm development, there is more to
the Libyan intervention than meets the eye, as is shown in Chapter 3.
The function of human rights as a policy tool in the Security Council during
the Cold War is instructive for looking at the current path of RtoP as a policy tool in
the United Nations. The decade following the Universal Declaration and Convention
on the Prevention of Punishment of the Crime of Genocide illustrates the difficulty of
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adopting a norm like human rights in an environment consumed by security and
ideological differences (Luck 2011). The comparative environment provides
important contextual clues as to the status of norm generation in general, i.e. that
norms develop most quickly in a world where primary security objectives are not
present. From a realist perspective this implies that humanitarian norms like the
Responsibility to Protect are secondary objectives for states. This is explored more
fully in the second chapter.
The United Nations has a legitimating influence on policies and norms.
Barnett and Finnemore claim, “[UN action] can legitimate policies […] create and
diffuse international norms, policies, and models of political organization around
the globe” (2009, 2). Oddly enough some scholars believe that the legitimating
influence of the United Nations could potentially serve as a barrier to multilateral
action in some cases. Alvarez (2009) implies that this legitimating power may
present a barrier to multilateral policy in the potential circumstance that if the
parties involved do not wish for their actions to be advanced as a legitimate norm
they may work outside of the UN to prevent such normalization. This may also lead
to pseudo-intervention (Thakur 2009) wherein the traditional norms like selfdefense and threats to international peace and security are referenced as
justification for intervention as opposed to the humanitarian crisis. These pseudointerventions may or may not be an effort to keep from legitimating the norm, or
they may be an attempt to maintain its legitimacy by not applying it too widely.
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It is relatively safe to say that the entirety of the Responsibility to Protect is
not considered to be a norm that necessitates or requires certain behaviors or
responses. There are portions of the ICISS report that have found a measure of
widespread acceptance, such as the concept that sovereignty does not entail
absolute power to do as one wishes, including committing genocide, with their own
population. This partial acceptance makes assessing the path of RtoP’s normative
development a difficult task. How RtoP is applied in present and future cases, and
how it develops in the United Nations will go a long way towards revealing this
development over time.

Chapter 2: Central Issues Explored
Introduction
This chapter examines the central issues of the Responsibility to Protect as
they relate to the moral and legal facets, as well as other practical effects of its
adoption as an international legal norm and its applications. The status of the
Responsibility to Protect as a legal norm is still under question and up for review.
The uncertain nature of RtoP is due to a number of issues involved in its
conceptualization and implementation. The central contentious issues surrounding
the concept of the Responsibility to Protect and its adoption as an international legal
norm are related largely to authority, legality, effectiveness and morality –
specifically the assertion of value systems and the redefinition of sovereignty. These
issues are addressed briefly in this introduction to provide context and expanded
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upon subsequently in more depth throughout the study conducted here. Briefly,
these issues are norm conflict, indeterminacy, prevention, the redefinition of
sovereignty, the Security Council’s legitimacy, the distinction between obligation
and permission, the potential abuse of intervention, and reconciling political will
and state interests. The theoretical foundation established in the previous chapter
allows us to address the practical and legal issues inherent in the potential
enforcement and adoption of the Responsibility to Protect.
The legal issues surrounding RtoP are fairly clear and straightforward.
Essentially, the controversy surrounds the norm conflict between sovereignty and
intervention. Sovereignty is a well-established norm in international law and the
foundation of the nation-state international system in which we currently find
ourselves. Part of sovereignty has traditionally been the norm of non-intervention in
essentially domestic affairs, a concept enshrined in Article 2 (7) of the UN Charter.
The Responsibility to Protect is asserting its propositions about the justified use of
force for humanitarian intervention by redefining or altering the established
sovereignty norms which the ICISS believes have changed over time enough to
justify this alteration. This in turn creates a conflict between the norms that is
difficult to reconcile. Related to this is the authority issue, i.e. who or what
international body is responsible for determining whether or not these
interventions are legitimate, and is that organization itself a legitimate authority to
make such a determination?
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Practically, RtoP suffers from the issues of indeterminate mechanisms for its
enforcement, including prevention, and effective enforcement. The triggers for
intervention are not well-established or particularly well-defined, nor are the
mechanisms for prevention and rebuilding. Furthermore, it may be physically
difficult to enforce prevention, reaction, and rebuilding with the right amount of
man power and boots on the ground. These practical considerations make it difficult
to move RtoP from the realm of theory to actual practice. The resolution of these
issues is required if RtoP is to become an effective norm enforceable by the
international community.
The moral issues surrounding RtoP are somewhat less straightforward than
the legal ones. There are moral implications embedded in the assertion of RtoP’s
protective human rights principles, and particularly so in the prevention principle of
RtoP – this issue is informed largely by the discussion on Theoretical Foundations in
the previous chapter. The fundamental motivating agent of RtoP is the assertion of
universal principles of human rights and, to a lesser but very real extent, democratic
and Western value systems. Intervention in the sovereign affairs of other nations
not only has legal implications, but moral ones as well. Such interventions imply the
hierarchical ordering of value systems and types of government. The assertion of
cosmopolitan ideals is found strongly in the ICISS report and the mechanisms for
prevention. Again, part of the objective of this work is to shine a light on the
mechanisms by which concepts that are generally considered to be “good” operate
and determine whether those mechanisms are equally good by a subjective
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measure. The discussion of the moral issues of RtoP is meant to accomplish this end.
The discussion on morality here, as opposed to the theoretical discussion of
morality in the previous chapter, is conducted by making direct reference to the
countries and peoples being affected by RtoP as opposed to more general theorizing
about the source of morality in international society.
Ultimately, the Responsibility to Protect is “dependent on the dominance of
particular ethical viewpoints” (Morris 2013, 1278), i.e. the Kantian, cosmopolitan
view of the source of rights and upon whom rights are conferred and to what
degree. The discussion of RtoP takes place in this context but recognizes that the
moral or ethical landscape of the international system may not always appear as it
does today. The following exploration of the central issues of RtoP takes for granted
that the international system is dominated primarily by powerful, Western
democracies and attempts to highlight the struggle between these democracies and
the rest of the world as it is represented by the RtoP norm.
Norm Conflict
Much of the controversy around RtoP can be summarized in terms of norm
conflict (Vranes 2006). In essence, RtoP asserts or creates international legal norms
that conflict with existing norms. As explored previously, the Commission has
asserted that the concept of sovereignty has changed or evolved, however this has
not been empirically proven, merely stated. The sovereignty norm has a
longstanding history, the essentials of which are provided in the first chapter, and
the redefinition of it puts RtoP into conflict not only with the sovereignty norms but
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other interrelated norms. The following section explores this conflict between
norms.
The tension between norms within the United Nations is relatively clear.
Ramesh Thakur writes, “the controversy over humanitarian intervention arises
from a conflict between different contemporary norms, producing normative
incoherence, inconsistency, and contestation.” Thakur also states that this inherent
tension exists within the United Nations Charter itself, as well, and is characterized
by “inherent tension between the intervention-proscribing principle of state
sovereignty and the intervention-prescribing principle of human rights” (2009: 2,
8). In part, the Commission attempts to reconcile or avoid this conflict between
sovereignty and intervention by trying to redefine sovereignty as opposed to openly
challenging it with another norm.
It is also useful here to attempt to explain what norms are meant to do in
order to understand how they are in conflict. Erich Vranes writes, “Norms have the
fundamental functions of obligating, prohibiting and permitting, according to
deontic (legal) logic” (2006, 398). The Responsibility to Protect permits and perhaps
obligates (depending on the crime committed and who makes the decision).
Sovereignty mostly just prohibits certain behaviors from the outside, i.e. the
international community is prohibited from interfering in matters that are under
the direct sovereign jurisdiction of a state. Both norms claim to explain the same
concept or conceptual framework and define it in mutually exclusive ways. Perhaps
more accurately, RtoP attempts to replace the traditional definition of sovereignty
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with its own. The traditional norm of sovereignty is undoubtedly mutually exclusive
in its permissions and prohibitions with the RtoP norm, thereby signaling a norm
conflict. According to the definitions provided by Vranes this is a contradictory
conflict between permission and prohibition. If attaining the regulation of behavior
in the international system is impaired by a permission incompatible with a
prohibition (i.e. you may and you may not), or a permission inconsistent with an
obligation (you may, but you must), these norms are by definition in conflict. This
does not mean, however, that both norms cannot exist at the same time even in the
case of their mutual exclusivity; “a norm conflict ‘is not a logical contradiction and
cannot even be compared to a logical contradiction’, as it is perfectly possible for
two conflicting norms to occur within one and the same legal system” (Vranes 2006,
399). From this we can draw the conclusion that the norm conflict exists, however
this recognition does not help us to reconcile the simultaneous existence of both
norms. Indeed, it is the very fact that they exist simultaneously within the same
system that is ultimately problematic. Even by a “broader” definition of norm
conflict RtoP creates controversy. According to this broader definition, “There is a
conflict between norms, one of which may be permissive, if in obeying or applying
one norm, the other norm is necessarily or potentially violated” (Vranes 2006, 418).
Obeying or applying the Responsibility to Protect essentially requires the
sovereignty norm be violated. Again, the Commission attempts to redefine this norm
in order to avoid the conflict and reframe the argument. As explored later, this
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violation can even take the form of activities below the threshold of outright
military intervention.
With respect to the Just War triggers for intervention discussed in the
Defining section in Chapter 1, the Commission provides a number of situations that
would satisfy the just cause requirement for intervention. The first four examples
provided are already covered by international treaties6 . The second two, however,
are less explicitly legal with respect to international legal precedent, and rely much
more heavily upon the redefinition of sovereignty as responsibility outlined in the
document. One is “state collapse” that results in civil war, etc., and the other is
“overwhelming natural or environmental catastrophes” (ICISS 2001, 33). The
relative lack of solid precedent makes these assertions slightly more dubious,
especially the civil war example. Enforcing R2P in the case of state collapse leading
to a civil war is in direct conflict not only with sovereignty norms, but the norm of
self-determination as well. C. A. J. Coady draws parallels with the American Civil
War to illustrate the hypocrisy and indeterminacy of some of the central RtoP
tenets. Coady writes;
The ghastly horrors of the American Civil War might have presented a case
for humane military intervention by outsiders, but as William Shawcross put
it: “If the prospect of having their conflict ‘managed’ for them by foreigners
(however well intentioned) would have been unwelcome to the American
people then, why should it be more acceptable to other peoples in the world
today just because the motives of those who believe fervently that
‘something must be done’ are often decent?” This indicates that the value of
self-government is connected to some form of sovereignty, and this in turn
The 1948 Genocide Convention, large scale loss of life, ethnic cleansing, systematic
killing, acts of terror, systematic rape, and the Geneva Conventions and Additional
Protocols (ICISS 2001, 33).
6
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should caution against any revived enthusiasm for benign imperialism
whether in the form of humane rescue or advancing democracy. (2009, 79)
The hypocrisy of the Commission and the United Nations in general can be seen in
this comparative thought exercise. The later section on the Prevention principle of
RtoP further highlights the normative and subjective nature of RtoP goals and the
values that it reflects. This shows that RtoP potentially and actually conflicts with
many norms, not just sovereignty. These conflicts are created in part by
indeterminacy and in part by inconsistent or inequitable application.
There are other norms within the Responsibility to Protect that conflict with
existing norms, as well. Chris Brown writes,
We have a number of relevant moral intuitions here, but they tend to
contradict one another – thus, most basically, we think peoples ought to be
self-determining but we also think they ought not to do bad things to each
other; we believe in human rights, but we believe that people ought not to be
forced into some uniform strait-jacket, such as the one mandated by the
international human rights regime, and so on. (Farer et. al. 2005, 225)
The norm conflicts presented by RtoP are numerous and difficult to reconcile. It is
not only the obvious norm conflict between state sovereignty and intervention that
is problematic for RtoP, but also norms regarding self-determination, use of force,
aggression, preemption, and non-interference.
Indeterminacy
The precision of definitions and concepts contained within the language of
the Responsibility to Protect are vital to its successful adoption. The fact of this
indeterminacy has been discussed, however this section addresses the issues
created by the indeterminate nature of a number of the concepts contained within
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RotP. This is essentially an issue of operational effectiveness (as opposed to
authoritative effectiveness which is addressed later), i.e. in deciding precisely what
should be done to stop atrocities (and by whom) rather than whether or not
something should be done to stop them. This is usually referred to in terms of the
second and third pillars of RtoP, i.e. international responsibility and military
intervention.
In simple terms, this indeterminacy is usually illustrated by the idea that
while most international actors believe that “something” should be done in the face
of atrocities (Pillar I), no one can seem to agree on what that something should be
(Pillars II and III). With respect to the lack of intervention in Darfur despite a fairly
widespread determination that “something” should be done, De Waal writes, “very
little attention was paid to the concept of operations and strategic goal. This
emphasis reﬂects the focus and content of the continuing debate on the
responsibility to protect, which has concentrated on when and whether to
intervene, not how to do so and with what aim in mind” (2007, 1045). This
highlights the effectiveness issue perfectly. Lawmakers, scholars and statesmen
seem to agree that “something” should be done, however they cannot seem to agree
with the same degree of ease as to what exactly should be done – this is a central
issue with the RtoP concept in practice. Even if the concept itself is accepted there is
a significant dearth of specific, operational literature on how to conduct the
interventions.

43
Even allegedly positive applications of RtoP or humanitarian interventions
do not precisely address this indeterminacy issue. Bellamy writes, “while the
Council’s response to the crises in Côte d’Ivoire and Libya might reflect a new
politics of protection, it is clearly much easier to agree on the principle that people
should be protected from serious crimes than it is to agree on what to do in specific
circumstances” (2011, 826). It seems to be relatively easy to agree that human
rights abuses are objectively immoral and should be stopped, however we have
fallen short on the mechanisms for determining when legitimate action should take
place and, furthermore, who should be taking it and how. Much of the literature on
this subject is an attempt to parse out such guidelines as they may be acceptable to
those powerful states with the ability to make binding decisions, like the permanent
members of the Security Council, for example. The case studies in Chapter 3 further
serve to highlight the practical effects of this difficulty.
This indeterminacy issue applies also to how and when determinations that
RtoP is required are made. Tom Farer (2005) and his colleagues endeavor to define
or outline the requirements for classifying a situation as one that dire enough to
trigger intervention obligations and/or requirements – among these requirements
are usually mentioned “slaughter, systematic torture, mass detention for an
indefinite period under deplorable conditions, and systematic and deep violation of
minority rights,” etc. The effort is an honorable and necessary one for the
acceptance of RtoP. However, the futility of these definitions once again becomes
clear – they are simultaneously too narrow and too broad, i.e. indeterminate. They

44
also usually include among their reasoning the ever-present concept of “imminent”
danger – a concept which itself lacks a clear or widely-accepted definition. Until
there exists a clear, widely-accepted definition of these concepts RtoP will be
continually hindered.
Prevention
The prevention principle of the Responsibility to Protect is essentially about
encouraging and facilitating respect for human rights abroad in order to lower the
chances of atrocities in cases of government failure, civil war, etc. Effective
prevention is a “key objective” of the International Commission on Intervention and
State Sovereignty. This effective prevention consists in large part of good “early
warning” capabilities (effective institutional frameworks for analyzing and acting
upon information), a good “preventive toolbox,” and “political will” (ICISS 2001, 20).
The prevention principle of RtoP is arguably its most presumptuous tenet. The
issues inherent to prevention are political, moral, and ethical. This section shows
that the attempts at prevention put forward by the ICISS are paternalistic,
ethnocentric, and preference-based. Furthermore, the mechanisms are ill-defined
and not always empirically effective. One of the questions fundamental to consider
within this section is this; when does prevention cross the line into preemption?
The “early warning” capabilities, or what the ICISS calls “root cause
prevention,” clearly reflect democratic values and the cultural, social, and economic
preferences of the First World policy makers. Along with the toolbox, these root
cause prevention measures are presented as political, economic, legal, and military.
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In the realm of political prevention they state, “this might involve democratic
institution and capacity building” (2001, 23). This may suggest that the writers of
the report believe democratic institutions are the most preferred when it comes to
preventing atrocities like genocide and ethnic cleansing. In reference to prevention
and rebuilding periods, the Commission states,
Apart from, hopefully, removing or at least greatly ameliorating, the root
causes of the original conflict and restoring a measure of good governance
and economic stability, such a period may also better accustom the
population to democratic institutions and processes if these had been
previously missing from their country. (ICISS 2001, 44)
This statement is offered as if democratic institutions are assumed to be preferable
to any other, without any qualifying statements. In this context, democracy and
democratic institutions are the default, the assumed best form of government or
societal organization. Whether or not this is true, it is beyond the scope of the UN to
prescribe government types to nations, especially in this context – this is precisely
why some countries cry neo-imperialism and are skeptical of RtoP as simply
another method for large, Western countries to intervene in smaller developing
nations and change their policies to be more Western. The guidelines for economic
root cause prevention are incredibly comprehensive, essentially advocating for a
full-scale conversion to free market capitalism:
This might involve development assistance and cooperation to address
inequities in the distribution of resources or opportunities; promotion of
economic growth and opportunity; better terms of trade and permitting
greater access to external markets for developing economies; encouraging
necessary economic and structural reform; and technical assistance for
strengthening regulatory instruments and institutions. (ICISS 2001, 23)
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These economic guidelines are even more normatively expressive than the political
ones. By speaking of what this prevention “might” involve, the Commission avoids
saying that prevention essentially involves such reforms. However hedged these
prescriptions are, they clearly reflect a certain belief system about what form of
government and what form of economic system is most beneficial.
For their part the ICISS does recognize the inherent coercive nature of
preventative measures. They point out that some nations fear “internationalization”
of issues which may in time lead to intervention and that they may be right to fear
this possibility. They offer two “answers” to this concern;
The first is for international policy makers to be sensitive to it: to recognize
that many preventive measures are inherently coercive and intrusive in
character, to acknowledge that frankly, and to make a very clear distinction
between carrots and sticks, taking care always in the first instance to fashion
measures that will be non-intrusive and sensitive to national prerogatives.
But the second answer is one for the states themselves: those who wish to
resist external efforts to help may well, in so doing, increase the risk of
inducing increased external involvement, the application of more coercive
measures, and in extreme cases, external military intervention. (ICISS 2001,
25)
The above is a rather puzzling paragraph from the Commission’s report. The first
answer rightly acknowledges that the countries being interfered with, at least
potentially, have a right to be concerned about intervention and that preventive
efforts should keep these concerns in mind. The second answer implies that states
should be concerned about being intervened with, because if they do not cooperate
with prevention efforts then they are potentially bringing more intervention and
intrusion upon themselves. This statement seems much more threatening than it
does explanatory or empathetic to the cultural and political sensitivities of
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intervention – it reads more as a warning than an assurance. It also implies, as does
the general language of prevention, that some manner of “guilt” has been preestablished and judgment passed on a number of aspects ranging from political to
economic. This may be where we cross the line from prevention to preemption. This
is partly a reflection of the indeterminacy problem, i.e. how a nation is determined
to be “at risk” and therefore require this root cause prevention. On the whole there
is an implication of superiority – an implication that the United Nations knows what
is best for its member nations who exhibit “risk factors” for atrocities. Essentially,
“This form of preventive intervention would institute comprehensive Western
regulation under the threat of military intervention if non-Western states were
‘unwilling or unable to cooperate’” (Chandler 2004, 67). The fact that the triggers
are so woefully indeterminate makes the assertions contained within the language
of prevention that much more problematic.
Even the most non-intrusive of prevention efforts may be seen by some
nations as a violation of sovereignty. As Bellamy (2010) notes, in the discussions of
RtoP following the 2005 Outcome Document, “Several member states worried that
information gathering and assessment by the UN violates sovereignty and can be
easily politicized” (148). The concern here being that the UN may make a
determination that this root cause prevention is required and the potentially
offending nation is forced to comply with surveillance and assessment measures or
face negative political consequences in spite of the fact that an infraction has yet to
take place, or perhaps never will. These concerns imply that prevention can be a
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violation of sovereignty norms by itself even before actual military intervention.
Edward Luck agrees that “some aspects of structural prevention could be quite
intrusive, just as are international development and peacebuilding programmes”
(2011, 11). Not only are these measure potentially intrusive, they also potentially
threaten the social and political structures of the target nations. The liberal view of
this nation-building strategy is that “aligning state prerogatives with the will and
consent of the people, the ruling class of any country must now fear the risk and
threat of international economic, criminal justice and military action if they […]
cross UN red lines of behaviour” (Weiss et. al. 2011, 14). The preceding statement by
Ramesh Thakur is emblematic of the liberal approaches to the spread and
enforcement of RtoP in a democratic context.
Prevention relates to the indeterminacy issue as well, i.e. when are
preventative measures triggered? As the Commission states, “military intervention
for human protection purposes should be restricted exclusively, here as elsewhere,
to those situations where large scale loss of civilian life or ethnic cleansing is
threatened or taking place” (ICISS 2001, 34). This places RtoP in a very exclusive
and specific category with a broader goal, i.e. protecting civilians. For example; even
though the overthrow of a democratic regime by military coup may theoretically
lead to large scale loss of civilian life, it does not necessarily lead to such, at least
insofar as the Just War triggers for RtoP are concerned. The purview of RtoP is
therefore dependent on the loss of life variable, and not to those things that may
lead to it. It is the job of the prevention portion of RtoP to support and maintain
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good relations with democratic regimes to potentially keep coups from happening
or perhaps be able to administer aid swiftly in the event that such aid is required.
The distinction between what does in fact and what may in theory lead to atrocities
is an important one that highlights the difficult nature of prevention.
These difficulties are heightened by the relatively non-empirical way in
which the necessity for preventative measures can be interpreted. In their
Supplementary Volume to their full 2001 report the ICISS writes;
Too heavy an emphasis on structural causes of conflict is also empirically
inaccurate - social inequities and resource scarcity do not in fact always lead
to deadly conflict, and they can in some instances produce healthy nonviolent
conflict that catalyzes positive social change. Protests in democratic societies
are an obvious example, but even armed struggle for self-determination
against a repressive regime may remain within acceptable bounds of
violence (ICISS 2001a, 32)
Though not contained in the main report, this supplementary caveat highlights the
operational issues inherent in attempting to carry out prevention effectively in a
legitimate way. It is not well-known what preventative efforts have a proven causal
relationship with a decline in the committing of atrocities, therefore prescribing
certain measures before any real guilt has even been determined is premature, to
say the least. As the case studies in the subsequent chapter show the question of
what level of violence is acceptable is not uniformly applied in each case.
The stated goal of prevention, to prevent the occurrence of atrocities like
genocide and ethnic cleansing, is an admirable and desirable one. However, the
mechanisms for achieving that end are woefully inaccurate, terribly restrictive and
ethnocentric, essentially establishing guilt prior to any crimes. The establishment of
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this guilt potentially opens the door for full-scale conversion to Western democracy
and free-market capitalism, institutional arrangements that are supposed to prevent
atrocities according to the Commission but without showing an actual causal
relationship. The advancement of these structures reflects the interests of the
privileged and powerful nations making and enforcing the policies on an
international level. Prevention may effectively amount to threat diplomacy in a
practical sense. Applying prevention presents a wide array of issues for RtoP.
The Redefinition of Sovereignty
One of the central propositions contained in the 2001 ICISS document is its
redefinition of sovereignty – it is also one of its most contentious propositions.
Sovereignty is an age-old concept with centuries of precedent and most if not all
nations still adhere to it internally and externally. The ICISS and others have
asserted that the concept of what sovereignty entails and the freedoms or
prohibitions it permits has changed enough since the establishment of the United
Nations that it requires redefinition. This section explores the claims made by the
Commission with respect to sovereignty in juxtaposition to the traditional concept
of sovereignty presented in Chapter 1. As a central tenet of RtoP, understanding the
effects of this redefinition is of the utmost importance.
Since we have already explored the traditional definitions of sovereignty in
Chapter 1, this section focuses more on the legality and legitimacy issues presented
by such a redefinition. The prevailing literature on RtoP suggests that there are
further characteristics of sovereignty than this included in the traditional
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Westphalian characteristics. Weiss claims, “In addition to the usual attributes of a
sovereign states that students encounter in international relations and law courses
in the 1934 Montevideo Convention – people, authority, territory, and independence
– there is another: a modicum of respect for human rights” (Weiss et. al. 2011, 9).
The Responsibility to Protect asserts that this respect for human rights has become
part of the definition of sovereignty and their proceeding argument is based upon
this assumption.
Kant wrote that clinging to sovereignty facilitates a kind of “state of nature”
existence that Hobbes explores in Leviathan (1651) on the international level,
wherein states are free to do as they wish without limit within their own borders. In
the Kantian sense, "Only savages would want to cling to their lawless freedom – 'we
regard this as barbarism, coarseness, and brutish debasement of humanity'" (Brown
1992, 36). Furthermore, this conception of the state of nature in international law
implies that force determines legality, which for Kant would be a "meaningless
abomination" (Brown 1992, 37). In this sense sovereignty is a shield that nations
may hide behind while they commit crimes against humanity within their own
borders. Kant and the ICISS want to say that international society is responsible for
preventing these atrocities, and that sovereignty in and of itself is not a valid
defense to keep the international community from doing so.
The definition of sovereignty as it stands currently is essential to the
operation of the RtoP principle and its potential acceptance as a norm, seeing as the
principle relies on a reexamination or redefinition of sovereignty in order to
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function. In light of the heretofore-examined definitions of sovereignty and their
substantial precedent, we come now to the definition of sovereignty as it is
contained in the premier RtoP document, the 2001 report from the International
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. Somewhat perplexingly, the
ICISS document (2001) makes its argument for the redefinition of sovereignty in a
relatively very short five paragraphs, the most central of which is worth quoting in
its entirety;
1.35 The defence of state sovereignty, by even its strongest supporters, does
not include any claim of the unlimited power of a state to do what it wants to
its own people. The Commission heard no such claim at any stage during our
worldwide consultations. It is acknowledged that sovereignty implies a dual
responsibility: externally – to respect the sovereignty of other states, and
internally, to respect the dignity and basic rights of all the people within the
state. In international human rights covenants, in UN practice, and in state
practice itself, sovereignty is now understood as embracing this dual
responsibility. Sovereignty as responsibility has become the minimum
content of good international citizenship. (8)
In the above paragraph taken from the document in question, the ICISS has
essentially presupposed that their goal has come to pass, i.e. the widespread
acceptance of their redefinition of sovereignty as responsibility and all of the
responsibilities that concept confers upon nation-state and their leaders.
The ICISS report takes for granted that the responsibility to protect exists
and then builds their argument upon that assumption. Welsh and Banda point out
the problematic nature of this kind of argument; “The [ICISS] Commissioners spent
the bulk of their time outlining the conditions under which the principle of nonintervention may be overridden in the name of protecting human rights, and less
time answering the fundamental question of why there is a prospective
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international responsibility to protect” (2011, 123). The Commission presumes the
outcome that they want and then builds their argument upon it, as if to make us ask
ourselves how we could have ever denied such a thing, all without really convincing
us that it is true in the first place.
The concept of the apparent erosion of sovereignty as a legal principle is also
referenced by a number of international legal scholars. Ramesh Thakur asserts, “The
gradual erosion of the once sacrosanct principle of national sovereignty is rooted
today in the reality of global interdependence” (2009, 11). The possible role that
interdependence plays in the sovereignty arguments is highlighted in the discussion
of globalization provided by the ICISS. In their 2001 report they assert, “In reality,
what is happening is a convulsive process of state fragmentation and state
formation that is transforming the international order itself. Moreover, the rich
world is deeply implicated in the process. Civil conflicts are fuelled by arms and
monetary transfers that originate in the developed world” (ICISS 2001, 5). This
sentiment is echoed by Neta Crawford in the 2005 Roundtable discussion on
humanitarian intervention after 9/11 when they write, “we ought to be more frank
about just exactly what it is that we are already doing to make the lives of others
more miserable or less miserable. What kinds of daily acts of intervention do we
practice, and to what effect” (Farer et. al. 2005, 232)? Crawford and the ICISS are
arguing that globalization negates the sovereignty norm in a way, in that we in the
prosperous West are already intervening in a myriad of different ways on a daily
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basis across the globe, however we use sovereignty as a shield when it comes to
responsibility to halt abuses. The point is well taken.
Perhaps the most difficult issue with the redefinition of sovereignty as
responsibility is a conceptual one. The redefinition of sovereignty is based upon the
assumption that an unspecified yet sufficient number of states have developed
values and practices similar to those held by the Western nations in order to make
them common practice, i.e. the shared expectation. The concept is thereby raised up
to a universal, cosmopolitan level. The universal approach states that all humans are
or should be afforded the same basic human rights insofar as the concept has
developed in international law. The concept itself is inherently and fundamentally
universal, hence the cosmopolitan theoretical perspective. This allows the logic of
multilateral humanitarian intervention to work, but that logic also requires that the
preceding assertion is indeed true. Even if the presence of a normative change could
be demonstrated, it may or may not be morally or ethically correct just because it is
a norm. Once R2P ascends to the level of an enforced international law (or perhaps
even a lower threshold such as normative acceptance), assuming it ever does, does
it automatically become morally justified? Do the norms, values, and practices
contained therein become universal in practice, or did they become accepted
because they are universal? What does this mean for moral relativism and the
communitarian perspective? This is especially problematic because R2P rests upon
the logic that these rights are universal in the first place, but they have to become
accepted as a norm to hold that claim as valid.
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Alex Bellamy echoes the claims of many pro-RtoP scholars when he writes,
“RtoP is universal and enduring — it applies to all states, all the time. From this
perspective, there is no question of whether RtoP ‘applies’ to a given situation
because RtoP does not arise and evaporate with circumstances” (2010, 158). This
claim is endemic to much of the literature that advocates for RtoP. It is undoubtedly
problematic, however, that RtoP assumes legitimacy in its very formulation without
having proven that legitimacy.
In light of the difficulties faced by redefining a concept as important to the
international system as sovereignty, one may wonder why it is that the Commission
has attempted such a task. Sovereignty is the bedrock of the international system
and fundamental to understanding international relations (bin Talal and Schwarz
2013). There is little chance that this 360-year-old concept will be thrown by the
wayside anytime soon, thus RtoP’s insistence on redefining the concept of
sovereignty as opposed to discarding it or attempting to challenge it directly. By
simply changing an existing concept the Commission attempts to do away with any
norm conflict. As we have seen, however, the norm conflict exists regardless of this
attempt. The redefinition of sovereignty, as opposed to its abandonment, is
therefore central to the success of RtoP for these reasons. This ties into one of the
central assertions of the ICISS, which is that the Responsibility to Protect
strengthens sovereignty as opposed to undermining it by helping nation-states in
fulfilling their sovereign duties, i.e. protecting their populations from genocide and
ethnic cleansing. The idea put forward by RtoP proponents is that RtoP is
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strengthening sovereignty by “helping States to meet their core protection
responsibilities” (Deller 2012, 67). It is difficult to understand how one strengthens
sovereignty by interfering in essentially sovereign affairs within the sovereign
jurisdiction of states. If RtoP is doing anything, it is strengthening the concept of
sovereignty that has been redefined and represented as fact by the SecretaryGeneral and other RtoP proponents, but certainly not the traditional definition of
sovereignty. It is strengthening a definition of sovereignty, but not the definition.
The concerns of some developing nations are that rather than strengthening
sovereignty as the Commission claims RtoP undermines sovereignty by opening the
door for a pattern of intervention in developing countries who do not have the
military capability to defend themselves and who may have value systems and
governments different from the interveners. Furthermore, some nations are
concerned about their comparatively limited role in the decision making process of
the authoritative body for RtoP, the United Nations Security Council. Weiss believes
that these reservations are summarized in part by Algerian President Abdelazia
Bouteflika:
We do not deny that the United Nations has the right and the duty to help
suffering humanity, but we remain extremely sensitive to any undermining
of our sovereignty, not only because sovereignty is our last defense against
the rules of an unequal world, but because we are not taking part in the
decision-making process of the Security Council. (Weiss 2004, 145)
This quotation suggests that the very countries whose sovereignty RtoP purports to
strengthen may see RtoP as a tool that weakens sovereignty. The above quote also
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highlights another important issue with respect to the role of the Security Council as
the ultimate authority when seeking approval for intervention.
Great powers are essentially immune to the same external responsibilities
that bind smaller powers with the redefinition of sovereignty. Furthermore, as is
shown in the following section, coercive action or even simply the determination of
violations against any permanent member of the United Nations Security Council
would be, in a word, impossible. In this respect, the Responsibility to Protect only
applies to nations who do not have the power to protect themselves from outside
interference. It is only the traditional concept of sovereignty that potentially
protects small nations from this kind of interference. Legally, this essentially means
that there is no “fair” way to apply RtoP concepts and carry out interventions that
still respects sovereignty.
The Security Council
The central authority question regarding the implementation of the
Responsibility to Protect is; who or what body or nation has the authority and
legitimacy to authorize an intervention based on RtoP principles? Furthermore,
when might a body besides the legitimate one make a determination outside of it
and still have it be legitimate? This section explores that legitimate authority, the
Security Council, and analyzes just how legitimate that authority is, some of its
challenges, and some of the issues created by the adoption of the Responsibility to
Protect. This includes some discussion of the legitimacy issues created by the veto
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held by the Permanent Five members of the Security Council (P5) and some of the
opinions on possible reforms.
The lion’s share of the literature on RtoP asserts that the only legitimate body
to make determinations on the enforcement of the Responsibility to Protect is the
United Nations Security Council (Bellamy 2005, Weiss 2004, ICISS 2001). The 2001
ICISS Document states that the Security Council is the most “appropriate” body for
authorizing military interventions for RtoP (XII). The UN is not only the enforcer,
but also the primary legitimating body of new international norms; ergo it is in the
interest of R2P proponents to foster application of the new norm within the United
Nations and by the Security Council. If it is not now a norm it may become one
through continued application by the UN as a legitimate body of international law.
The United Nations has become the primary legitimate decision-making body for
international law, even though that was never the original intention of the charter
(Alvarez 2009). From this we can infer that the United Nations and by definition the
Security Council is widely considered to be the legitimate organization through
which RtoP is enforced.
If the United Nations does exist as some kind of Kantian cosmopolitan ideal,
then the UN itself may be an agent of moral legitimacy and action. Brown writes,
"Kantian ethics are agent-centered; they impose duties upon individuals and these
duties cannot be displaced to social structures -- although such structures may also
be agents" (1992, 52). The United Nations as a focal point allows individuals as
agents to assert their moral conceptions in line with Kant’s “universal kingdom of
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ends,” and in doing so the organization itself becomes an agent as it continues to
embody the will of the individuals and nation-states that make it up. Ian Hurd
defines legitimacy as “an actor’s normative belief that a rule or institution ought to
be obeyed,” and notes that “its presence changes the strategic calculation made by
actors about how to respond to the institution.” Furthermore, Hurd breaks down the
perception of legitimacy, which can be extended to enhance the institution, into
three contributing factors; favorable outcomes, fairness, and correct procedure
(2007: 7, 30, 67).
In spite of the arguments for Security Council legitimacy and the apparent
general acceptance of the Security Council answer to the authority question, there
are also a number of researchers and legal scholars who believe that there should be
a way to circumvent the Security Council in the case where there is a deadlock
caused by the use of vetoes by any of the Permanent Five members of the Council,
but where intervention-triggering violations are nonetheless occurring (ICISS
2001). The study of Kosovo in Chapter 3 illustrates this difficulty. This concept is
also built into the ICISS Document’s definition of the Responsibility to Protect. The
opening outline of the document under the section titled “Right Authority” asks that
the Security Council agree to not use the veto in cases of humanitarian intervention,
and that the General Assembly should consider the use of the Uniting for Peace
Resolution in situations of Council deadlock due to use of the veto.
Use of the veto is not only a practical obstacle but a political one as well, with
countries like Algeria feeling there is a democratic deficit in the Council that may
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threaten the legitimacy of their determinations. The ICISS recognized this in their
2001 document; “Many of our interlocutors regarded capricious use of the veto, or
threat of its use, as likely to be the principal obstacle to effective international action
in cases where quick and decisive action is needed to stop or avert a significant
humanitarian crisis” (51). There is a significant amount of scholarly literature on the
various ways in which Security Council legitimacy may be enhanced. Most of this
literature involves some manner of Security Council reform, whether that be
expansion of the Security Council (Hoffman and Ariyoruk 2005), reform or abolition
of the veto (Weiss 2003, Fassbender 2003), or some other kind of intermediate
reform that is a combination of the two or gives some limited concessions with
promises of more reform at a later date (Martini 2009). The possibility of Security
Council reform is somewhat mixed among the literature, but generally considered to
be unlikely, especially with regards to the P5 veto power. Weiss and Young’s
research suggests that two thirds of the academic community believes that reform is
possible, albeit within the next three, or more than five years. According to the same
data, however, a high percentage of UN officials do not believe that reform is
possible (2005, 134, fig.1). Weiss writes in the same 2005 paper, “there is no chance
that the P-5 will ever agree to altering the veto” (132). This seems to be the general
sentiment, especially considering that all of the proposals that have attempted this
are vehemently opposed by the P5.
It is not only the veto problem that represents obstacles for Security Council
legitimacy. Critical Legal Theory scholars believe that mainstream international
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relations and international law are promoting Western ideology and ignoring the
“deployment of power” when determining the legitimacy and morality of norms
(Alvarez 2009, 19). This is partially shown in how rogue nations are labeled and
dealt with, for example, and provides an interesting lens through which to view the
development of RtoP and legitimacy of the Security Council. The veto and the
implied democratic deficit within the Security Council cast doubts upon the
conclusions and laws reached therein. In the Oxford Handbook, Alvarez writes,
The ability of powerful states to manipulate who gets to participate in
institutional lawmaking and to what end—as through “forum shifting” […]
selective condemnations of “rogue” states, or unequal access to or
participation in institutionalized dispute resolution—casts doubt on whether
the new conception of sovereignty as “status” or of compliance as
“socialization” really constitutes progress or “progressive development.” (2223)
The least powerful nations who are most at risk of having their sovereignty violated
by RtoP have the least amount of say in the Security Council. This in turn creates
problems for the legitimacy of RtoP and the Council itself. From a practical and
realist perspective, “powerful states are much more likely to avoid being labelled
perpetrators of RtoP crimes, in a manner that makes them liable for the adoption of
extraordinary measures against them,” and they are more likely to “get away with”
norm-violating behavior (Bellamy 2013, 342). The legitimacy problems created by
this assertion are staggering – how can a body be legitimate when it cannot itself be
bound in the same way by the rules it enforces? This may work for a national
government’s monopoly on coercion, however the United Nations ideally operates
on the principle of the equality of its members (Fisher 2008).
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Furthermore, as previously noted, RtoP relies on the dominance of particular
ethical viewpoints to function; therefore the power dynamics of the veto-wielding
members of the Permanent Five members of the Security Council are important for
understanding RtoP development. As Morris notes, “A realignment in global power
in favour of those normatively predisposed towards sovereign rather than
individual rights is likely, therefore, to augur badly for R2P” (2013, 1279). This
possibility extends outside of the Security Council, as well. Russia and China in
particular have expressed a preference for the norm of non-intervention on a
number of occasions, or at least distaste for its potential erosion (Bellamy 2011a).
Regarding the Libyan intervention, Morris notes, “China, declaring itself to be
‘always against the use of force’, shared India’s latter anxiety, as did Russia, which
perceived a ‘morphing’ of the pro-interventionary position into something which
could ‘potentially open the door to large-scale military intervention’” (2013, 1272).
This stance is characteristic of Russia and China’s stances on intervention
throughout recent history.
The discussion regarding the veto and Security Council legitimacy highlights
one of the central normative conflicts of RtoP, which is that the Security Council is
the legitimate authority for authorizing interventions, yet there needs to be a way to
circumvent that authority because the determination that intervention is required
or justified has already been made outside of the legitimate decision-making body.
This issue is also practically related to the problems inherent in the application of
prevention and establishment of guilt. When looked at in this context it is clear that
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intervention has been determined to be justified a priori, and its acceptance by the
Council is merely a bureaucratic issue or formality, i.e. it is a foregone conclusion.
RtoP has built into it a number of potential mechanisms to subvert the Council,
while at the same time the document and other international relations scholars
state that the Council is the most appropriate forum for deciding severity,
authorizing military intervention, etc. These safety measures are understandable,
yet admittedly difficult to reconcile. How can the Security Council be the legitimate
authority on the issue when plans for subverting that authority are being made in
the same breath?
According to David Chandler it is the cosmopolitan character of the
redefinition of sovereignty that is at fault because it, “enables the Commission to
come up with a set of moral criteria for military intervention which are held to exist
independently of international law or any particular political decision or consensus
in the Security Council” (2004, 69). The legitimacy of RtoP intervention is a foregone
conclusion in this context because the norm claims to be universal and externalizes
internal sovereignty. Bridging the gap between the determination to act and actually
acting proves to be difficult. This highlights the legal issues inherent in applying a
Universalist, cosmopolitan norm like RtoP.
The Security Council authority issue is problematic conceptually, i.e. in that
the determination that a given intervention is justified has already been
predetermined before the decision reaches the Council. In this light the issue
becomes a battle between legitimacy, authority and effectiveness. Achieving
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consensus is a legitimacy and authority issue. However, there remains the potential
problem that it will not be possible to achieve consensus within the Security
Council, or perhaps even within the General Assembly, which is the fear expressed
by the ICISS. But because the decision that an intervention should take place has
already been determined prior to reaching the Council, this creates an effectiveness
issue. Essentially, responsibility cascades down until there is not even enough
power left to enact anything even in the case of consensus, and by the time it filters
down far enough to achieve consensus, there is not enough power or legitimacy held
by those in agreement to act effectively. Chesterman quotes Jennifer Welsh as
saying, “the disjunction between stated political objectives and available military
means would have Clausewitz turning in his grave” (2011, 10). Though admittedly
glib, this entertaining comment highlights the problematic divide presented by RtoP
between authority and effectiveness.
The Commission refers to this problem in their discussion of the
precautionary principle of reasonable prospects;
Application of this precautionary principle [reasonable prospects] would on
purely utilitarian grounds be likely to preclude military action against any
one of the five permanent members of the Security Council even if all the
other conditions for intervention described here were met. […] This raises
again the question of double standards – but the Commission’s position here,
as elsewhere, is simply this: the reality that interventions may not be able to
be mounted in every case where there is justification for doing so, is no
reason for them not to be mounted in any case. (ICISS 2001, 37)
While the Commission openly admits the somewhat unfair nature of the concept in
principle, they do highlight the problematic nature of the issue. If the Responsibility
to Protect cannot be applied fairly within the governing body for its enforcement,
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perhaps it should not be applied at all, or a different rule should be formulated. This
also highlights the other issue discussed in this section, which is that the
Commission and the General Assembly automatically assume the acceptance and
legitimacy of the concept as a norm. To them RtoP is already a norm, and therefore
we must apply it if we can – its acceptance is assured. The Commission is essentially
saying that the end goal of what RtoP hopes to accomplish is worth the issues
inherent in its practical application, i.e. Security Council legitimacy.
The Commission recognizes this difficulty and offers in their conclusion the
consideration that if the Council allows action outside of the UN that finds favor
politically among international actors, then that action threatens the legitimacy of
the UN itself. It therefore behooves the Council to prevent that from happening by
making intervention a priority for them. This caution by the ICISS is an attempt to
make it a vital interest for the Council to make RtoP a priority and pursue its
normalization. Their approach takes into consideration the power dynamics of the
UN, i.e. suggesting that a loss of collective power (perhaps through a loss of
legitimacy) may occur in cases of UNSC inaction, wherein states find it more
beneficial and acceptable to act outside of it as they did in the Kosovo intervention.
Bardo Fassbender makes particular note of this consideration: “the price that
members of the international community will have to pay for their prolonged
neglect of, and indifference to, the future of the Security Council and the
international security system built around it, may be much higher than they seem to
imagine today” (2003, 217). Fassbender worries that a decrease in the legitimacy of
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the Security Council over a long period of time, caused in large part by the neglect of
its members, may eventually render the Council irrelevant.
The General Assembly in In Larger Freedom (2005a) states, “The task is not
to find alternatives to the Security Council as a source of authority but to make it
work better” (33). There are those skeptical of RtoP who claim that the Security
Council must undergo some kind of a reform before RtoP is accepted by the
international community (Deller 2012). Weiss (2004) among others, does not
believe that this reform is possible. This leaves the General Assembly and the ICISS
in a tough position with regards to establishing a legitimate authority for making
RtoP determinations. If the United Nations is to be the legitimate body for
determining and enforcing the Responsibility to Protect is must itself have
legitimacy.
Obligation or Permission
There is some question as to whether the Responsibility to Protect triggers
an obligation to the international community to act to halt abuses, or if it merely
permits the international community to intervene. The distinction between
permission and obligation is an important one to make for the purposes of
advancing our understanding of RtoP. There are undoubtedly some international
norms that, when violated, trigger an international obligation to react, i.e. an erga
omnes obligation that implies universal jurisdiction for punishing the crime. These
are known as jus cogens violations. The most notable of these norms is the
Convention against genocide established after the atrocities committed during
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World War II. The central logic of this obligation is that genocide is so abhorrent
that allowing it to occur flies in the face of everything that modern society stands
for. Clear cases of genocide may still be the only situations that trigger such an
obligation7. With regards to offenses “less shocking” than genocide that RtoP wishes
to encompass, i.e. ethnic cleansing and war crimes, Thomas Weiss posits, “ there is
no legal and certainly no political obligation to act, but at most a moral one” (Farer
et. al. 2005, 235). It may come to pass, however, that the norm continues to develop
into one that obligates states to act. Steven Groves (2011) worries that if RtoP ever
obtains the status of binding international customary law, then its principles may be
considered obligatory rather than permissive or voluntary, which would restrict the
military and diplomatic sovereignty and autonomy of the United States.
The question of obligation is not only important in deciphering the
normative status of RtoP, but necessary to establish what kind of effect the
responsibility has on state behavior. The question is whether or not states are now
“burdened with the responsibility to take action” (Strauss 2010, 51). Furthermore,
does this burden carry with it any penalties for inaction, much like the duty to
rescue laws sometimes found in domestic legal systems? As Stahn asks, “what if
states or international authorities do not live up to their residual responsibility to
protect? Should such omissions equally be subject to some sanction; and, if so, how
The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
Article I states, “The Contracting Parties confirm that genocide, whether committed
in
time of peace or in time of war, is a crime under international law which they
undertake to prevent and to punish” (U. N. General Assembly 1948, 174).
7
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should they be remedied” (2007, 117)? The essential question here is that if the
international community has an obligation to step in to enforce RtoP (whether or
not they do is as yet in question), assuming that all the just war criteria have been
met and it is determined by a legitimate international body like the UN, what, if
anything, happens when they then choose not to act? In other words what are the
“consequences of noncompliance” (Stahn 2007, 118)? There does not yet exist any
practical answer to this question.
With respect to Pillars II and III of RtoP, Bellamy and Reike (2011) make the
claim that there is legal content to pillars two and three in contrast with some of the
prevailing opinions. They claim “states have a legal duty to take peaceful measures
to prevent genocide wherever they have relevant influence and information and an
obligation to use peaceful means to ensure compliance with the laws of war” (100).
This is based on analysis of ICJ cases and ICC jurisdiction, including the 2007 ICJ
case Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro. As the aforementioned the
case establishes, “the Article 1 obligation to prevent genocide requires that states
‘employ all means which are reasonably available to them’” (Bellamy et. al. 2011,
91). This is also addressed by Rosenberg (2011) in “Framework for Protection.” This
implies that there seems to be some development of at least a regional
responsibility to protect (as well as relevant prevention measures) with real legal
consequences when it comes to well-established cases like genocide, ethnic
cleansing, etc., but Rosenberg reminds us that this obligation to was never expressly
agreed to in the Outcome Document (2011, 192).
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If RtoP is indeed an obligatory norm it would suggest legal sanction in the
case of inaction. However, as Strauss notes, “it is difficult to imagine how noncompliance of a political body could be practically challenged” (2010, 53). It would
also “require an agreement on objective criteria for the establishment of manifest
failure and the requirement of collective action” (53). If inaction requires
punishment, we must therefore be crystal clear on which situations legally require
action in this context. The section in this chapter on the indeterminacy issue of RtoP
makes the legal portion of these determinations incredibly difficult to determine.
The preceding analysis of the Security Council conducted here in this work also
strongly suggests that there is no realistic way that punishing noncompliance by the
Security Council could ever happen in a meaningful way. What this revelation brings
to the discussion here is allowing us to explore how much this may hurt or hinder
the legitimacy of RtoP and how difficult it is to elucidate it as a legal concept. Not
only would it be ineffective to act against any Security Council member by using the
United Nations, it would be similarly ineffective if not impossible to levy any kind of
sanction against any member of the P5 in the case that they chose inaction over
action. If there is no penalty for noncompliance then to what extent does the norm
have force?
Abusing Intervention
A central issue of Responsibility to Protect is its potential to provide another
justification for the interference of powerful states into the domestic affairs of the
weak to serve other security or economic interests. There are fears that RtoP may
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be abused to justify pseudo-interventions like those carried out during the Cold War
period under the guide of humanitarian intervention. In this section these concerns
are explored through reference to the academic literature.
There exist real worries within the international communities, especially by
developing nations, that RtoP may provide another potential tool with which
powerful nations may justify military interventions. Alex Bellamy refers to this as a
“Trojan horse,” one that potentially, ”legitimizes great power interference in the
affairs of the weak” (2010, 152). Edward Luck (2011) agrees that the potential
misuse of RtoP is still a real concern. This concern can be partially addressed by
making sure that multilateralism is one of the foundations of RtoP enforcement,
though there are certainly issues with that as we have seen. These concerns are not
without merit, and it is the responsibility of those who support RtoP to assuage
them.
International relations scholar Thomas Weiss (2004) seems to think that
these concerns are somewhat overstated, and that the problem up until now has not
been an overabundance of humanitarian interventions, but rather a severe lack
thereof. Weiss’ counterpoint to the idea that R2P will be misused is well taken. To
suggest that RtoP will suddenly become as prominent so to be abused does not fit
the reality of RtoP’s practice or acceptance. Realist theories of international
relations would tell us that powerful countries will continue to intervene
unilaterally or otherwise regardless of the status of RtoP interventions if and when
their vital interests are threatened. In short, it won’t make a difference with respect
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to the potential abuse issue – powerful states can always find a reason to intervene.
In this context the Responsibility to Protect is not providing a new policy tool to
potentially intervening nations that they would not have otherwise had. As Krasner
states, “the principles associated with both Westphalian and international legal
sovereignty have always been violated” (1999, 24). If the violations are indeed
inevitable then RtoP potentially provides an impetus for action to halt atrocities by
effectively raising the stakes politically, even if there is a confluence of interest.
In some ways, the pro-RtoP literature attempts to reconcile this by assuming
the right intentions of states, especially because there are so many vagaries and
ways to abuse the principle. They do generally hedge and admit that motives may
not be 100% pure, however the construction of their logical basis for the application
of RtoP implies that they believe states will act in a somewhat altruistic or at least
partially other-interested manner when adhering to the principles. This tendency is
evidenced in Evans and Sahnoun’s survey of the Just War interventions (2002). This
does assume, however, that states actually want to prevent and react to human
rights abuses outside their own borders.
Bellamy (2010) reminds us that a determination of a Responsibility to
Protect trigger does not automatically confer legitimacy on coercive intervention.
That is to say that even though RtoP could potentially act as a Trojan horse, labeling
a situation as one that calls for RtoP enforcement does not always lead to
intervention or legitimacy. Conversely, in his 2004 work, Weiss is reminds us that
while RtoP may not be providing a new policy tool to justify unnecessary
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interventions based on the interests of a single nation, what it may do it provide a
new policy option in the case of real or potentially imminent abuses. Furthermore,
RtoP “has the effect of elevating certain issues above normal politics as a catalyst for
decisive international action” (Bellamy 2010, 159). This can, of course, have positive
and negative consequences. This not only allows intervention to be justified, it also
potentially allows the Trojan horse problem to manifest itself.
Political Will and State Interests
Historically, there have been a number of humanitarian interventions carried
out in situations where the humanitarian interest existed concurrently with other
vital state interests. This has been referred to elsewhere as pseudo-intervention and
is further illustrated by the normative development of international human right
regime during the Cold War, wherein it appeared that human rights development
was subordinate to other political and security concerns. Alternatively there are
those who believe that the former concerns are not subordinate, but that the
coincidence of interests makes interventions more likely to occur (Weiss, et. al.
2011, 13). The focus of RtoP proponents tends to be in making RtoP a state interest
vital enough to be enforced on its own without the need for these additional
concurrent interests to be present. This is often referred to as the “political will” for
intervention (Albright and Williamson 2013). The question then becomes; how do
we engage great powers in places where they have no strategic interests? Part of the
answer is to make adhering to an international norm like RtoP a strategic interest
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As Badescu and Bergholm write, “responses to conscience-shocking
situations have depended on political conditions and interests at stake in the
conflicts in question, as well as on the willingness and capabilities of various actors
– whether international or regional organizations or individual states – to react”
(289). This is shown in part by the lack of action in certain situations which (the
argument could be made) qualify for RtoP intervention, i.e. Darfur, North Korea, etc.
Lack of political will shows the limitations of the norm as a vital state interest. Alex
Bellamy’s 2013 article leads to some useful conclusions after collecting data on the
coincidence of atrocities, calls for RtoP, and Security Council resolutions;
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Location
Myanmar
India
Nepal
CAR
Afghanistan
DRC
Somalia
Iraq
Sudan
Ethiopia
Thailand
Kenya
Chad, CAR, Sudan
Sri Lanka
Pakistan
Nigeria
DRC, Uganda, Sudan, CAR
Guinea
Rwanda, DRC
Kyrgyzstan
Cote d'Ivoire
Syria
Egypt
Libya
Yemen

Year
Fatalities
2006-2007
416
2006-2011
1855
2006
109
2006
102
2006-2011
788
2006-2011
5144
2006-2011
973
2006-2011
4765
2006-2011
699
2007-2008
268
2007-2011
754
2007-2008
434
2007
267
2008-2009
866
2008-2010
1252
2008
123
2008-2011
2587
2009-2010
160
2009
202
2010
470
2010-2011
750
2011
1807
2011
423
2011
1215
2011
350

RtoP
Y
N
N
N
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
N
Y
Y
Y
N
Y
Y
Y
N
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y

UNSCR
N
N
N
N
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
N
N
N
Y
N
N
N
Y
N
Y
N
Y
N
N
Y
Y

TABLE 1: Security Council Resolutions by Country (Adapted from Table I. Bellamy
2013, 338-339)
In the above table the fatalities are best estimate and the final two columns
indicate whether or not RtoP was invoked by a government, NGO, or the UN and
whether there was a UN Security Council Resolution on that particular conflict as a
result. Bellamy’s full data set implies a number of conclusions. The first is that
efforts to invoke RtoP in situations where other vital interests are of a primary
concern have generally proven to be unsuccessful. In the cases of Myanmar,
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Ethiopia, Nigeria, and Guinea there are calls for RtoP to be invoked despite the
relatively low number of casualties. Security Council did not follow from these
arguably less obvious or egregious RtoP claims. This suggests that RtoP in and of
itself is not a sufficient justification for intervention which may help to assuage the
aforementioned Trojan horse concerns. The second implication is that the severity
of the atrocity in and of itself is not usually sufficient enough to modify state
behavior or lead to a Security Council resolution. The cases of India, Pakistan, Syria,
and Sri Lanka show relatively high or moderate numbers of causalities with little or
no action by the Security Council or associated groups for RtoP. Bellamy himself
concludes, “This suggests that there is no clear linkage between the gravity of the
problem in terms of civilian lives lost, the invocation of RtoP and the likelihood of
Security Council resolutions” (2013, 341). These conclusions show that the
Responsibility to Protect is a political issue, not a humanitarian or cosmopolitan one.
The data presented here by Bellamy shows that alliances and relative power hold
more sway in the state decision making process on whether or not to intervene or
invoke RtoP than does the number of lives lost, thereby necessitating the effort to
shift state priorities and highlighting the central issue. It also shows, as Bellamy
states, that the invocation of RtoP can potentially elevate a situation that is less dire
to one that requires or elicits decisive action – i.e. it becomes politically viable
As Eckert correctly claims, “As long as the implementation of the
responsibility to protect falls to states, states will be guided by their interests”
(2012, 98). However, they also note that state interests are not static and can change
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over time. This highlights the need expressed also by Luck (2010) that political will
is the most important aspect of implementing RtoP, i.e. making it in the interests of
powerful nations to intervene. The ICISS report seems more determined to force
states to comply with RtoP by redefining their responsibilities both domestically
and internationally as opposed to making it in their interests to not only respect
human rights at home but to foster the expansion of responsible sovereignty abroad.
Chris Brown (Farer, et al, 2005) reminds us, “there is no clear-cut divide
between humanitarian and non-humanitarian actions, and therefore any attempt to
set up a system of rules for the former is likely to lead to a degree of frustration”
(228). For Brown this is illustrated by the inability to conclusively decipher the
actual state interests involved in intervention, i.e. whether a given intervention was
carried out for humanitarian reasons or for other reasons under the guise of
humanitarianism. Whether or not the prevention of atrocities is currently a vital
interest of states in a position to carry out such prevention, Brown seems certain
that it should be – “The desire to live in a world in which gross violations of human
dignity do not take place, and a willingness to help to bring this about, is a legitimate
state interest, as is promotion of the well-being of the nation, and the protection of
the lives of its citizens, including the lives of its soldiers” (Farer et al 2005, 228).
Legally, this desire is already reflected in the existence of jus cogens norms.
Brown’s discussion of intervention as a state interest helps highlight a
central problem with the R2P concept, which is that the action itself is purported to
be entirely altruistic by some proponents even though it requires that we impose a
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Western value system upon the nation within which we are intervening. Brown’s
explanation helps to alleviate the first problem by defining the humanitarian
interest itself as a state interest instead of in the interest of humanity or the world
society, or some such other vague cosmopolitan-inspired concept of natural law. By
putting humanitarian intervention into comparatively more realist terms, the
actions make more sense from a state-centric perspective. Furthermore, the
intervention becomes less about imposing our values, and more about pursuing our
interests as a nation-state. The distinction may seem semantic if the outcome is the
same, however it seems more accurate and perhaps more “honest” to explain the
intervention in terms of state interests rather than more “cosmopolitan” interests
associated with altruistically helping citizens of other nation states. This conception
also avoids somewhat the problem of imposing an international, cosmopolitan
concept of Western ideals, because they are now just the interests of a particular
state, not purported to be universal in any way. By placing humanitarian
interventions in a state-centric context, we effectively “own” the intervention as a
state interest as opposed to a claim that we serve some kind of higher interest
belonging to international society.
Alex J. Bellamy believes that RtoP has the power to shape important
contextual and historical factors like legitimacy. Although this is potentially true of
any norm in the international context, the goal for Bellamy seems to be changing the
values, ideas, and interests of states in a decidedly constructivist approach through
“naturalization and internalization” of the norm or idea (2013, 344). Finnemore

78
believes that these value changes are already occurring; “Strong states continue to
intervene in weaker states on a massive scale when it suits them. What has changed
is when it will suit them – not the fact of intervention but its form and meaning.
What have changed are the state understandings about the purposes to which they
can and should use force” (2003, 3). Finnemore suggests that legitimate
humanitarian concerns are being folded into the vital interests of states through
continued use and normative acceptance over time.
International organizations also have an important role to play in shaping
state interests. International organizations can alter or affect state priorities and/or
policies which in turn create new departments and institutional positions
domestically which then affects internal policies (Alvarez 2009). The ICISS asserts,
“good international citizenship is a matter of national self-interest” (2001, 36). If
this is true, then if RtoP is accepted as a norm throughout international
organizations, governmental or other, it would behoove nations as good
international citizens to accept it, thereby altering their own behavior and policies
in accordance with it.
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Chapter 3: Case Studies – Kosovo, Libya, Syria
Introduction
In light of the exploration of the issues most central to the Responsibility to
Protect it is now possible to explore some of the practical applications of it within
the last few years in order to determine where the norm currently stands. This goal
is pursued in this third chapter by conducting a critical examination of two of the
most recent and most high profile cases wherein RtoP was invoked by a
government, NGO, or international organization – The Libyan intervention and the
Syrian Civil War spurred by the Arab Spring in 2011. A comparison of these two
cases helps highlight the relative effectiveness of RtoP and its normative status
within the international community. The case study begins, however, with an
overview of the NATO intervention in Kosovo and how this sparked the evolution of
the humanitarian intervention norm which eventually became the Responsibility to
Protect.
Before beginning this exploration it is important to keep in mind the concept
of linear development whilst considering the development of RtoP as a norm. As
Justin Morris reminds us, it is essential that scholars and policy makers remain
mindful that the development of norms in international law, especially one as
disputed as RtoP, is not linear (2013, 1278). What Morris means by this is that even
though norms may appear to move towards acceptance in light of positive cases of
their application or rhetoric we must remain cautiously optimistic and not assume
that the norm cannot also move “backwards,” as it were, and be less accepted in
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light of failure or other developments in the international legal community. Morris
writes, “The constant danger of reading too much into current events and the
temptation to exaggerate the inductive potential of individual (and particularly
infrequent) cases must be guarded against” (1280). This is not to say that individual
cases should be discarded, but merely that the success of one case does not imply or
prove incontrovertibly the widespread acceptance or application of the norm, and
international legal scholars and policy makers should be aware of this fact. The
following comparison of actual or potential humanitarian intervention and RtoP
across three separate cases serves to illustrate this concept.
Kosovo
The case of the NATO intervention in Kosovo, along with the dubious action
or inaction of the United Nations in the Rwandan genocide, is often cited as one of
the international experiences essential to the formulation of a need for effective
humanitarian intervention (ICISS 2001, U. N. General Assembly 2005, De Waal 2007,
Thakur 2009). As this section shows, the international community learned many
lessons from the unilateral NATO action in the Kosovo War, lessons which were
subsequently applied to the formulation of the Responsibility to Protect. The
following presents some of the details leading up to the intervention, the
intervention itself, and some of the post-intervention issues and analysis.
Throughout is reference to and analysis of Security Council resolutions 1160, 1199,
and 1244 as they pertain to the evolution of humanitarian protection language and
norms.
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The intricacies of the crisis in Kosovo eventually escalating into full-scale
civil war, international intervention, and ethnic cleansing are varied and complex.
There seems to be no simple explanation of the myriad causes of the conflict as they
involve multiple actors and stretch back years before the actual war. This
recounting does not attempt to provide a fully comprehensive understanding of all
aspects of the conflict, but rather provides a brief explanation of the most important
aspects as necessitated by our discussion of the Responsibility to Protect and the
Kosovo crisis’ hand in shaping it. The Kosovo Report put together by the
Independent International Commission on Kosovo (IICK) (2000) provides a fairly
comprehensive overview of the events leading up to the conflict and the details of
the conflict itself. During the time of the conflict Kosovo was a part of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) and since having their autonomy revoked in 1989 they
had been led locally by the League for a Democratic Kosovo (LDK). The subsequent
conflicts within and regarding Kosovo can be attributed in large part to its ethnic
composition. According to the IICK report, “Over the period 1961–81, the
proportion of Albanians in the population of Kosovo rose from 67% to 78%. This
was due both to the very high birth rate of Albanians and to outmigration of Serbs
and Montenegrins” (2000, 38). By 1991 the Serb population was only 9.9%. As the
Kosovar Albanian population continued to grow and gain political support through
the LDK there was talk of independence and autonomy (IICK 2000, 48). The Serb
minority in Kosovo was concerned that they were being oppressed and forced out
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by the Kosovar Albanians and clashes were occurring with increasing frequency and
violence on both sides.
The concerns of the Serb minority in Kosovo bring us to the rise of Slobodan
Milosevic, a controversial figure central to the analysis of this conflict. Milosevic
ascended to the presidency of the FRY in 1997. According to the Commission, “The
origins of the crisis have to be understood in terms of a new wave of nationalism
that led to the rise of Milosevic and the official adoption of an extreme Serbian
nationalist agenda” (2000, 1). Milosevic was able to rise to power partially through
his support of the Serb minority in Kosovo – the Commission’s report cites his
infamous words of “No one should dare beat you,” to Serbs clashing with police
during a visit to Kosovo in 1987, after which he became a “national hero overnight”
(40). The ethnic composition therefore became a central issue for Milosevic and his
eventual presidency, which led to his Serbian nationalist agenda and repression
against the Kosovar Albanians. The continued clashes and increasing violence gave
rise to the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) in 1996, a violent group that aimed to
achieve for Kosovo what they believed the LDK had not. The rise of the KLA
prompted more violent and rigorous response from the Serbian government. As the
Commission writes, “With the rise of the KLA, the already pervasive police
harassment increased. The Serbian government proclaimed the KLA a terrorist
organization, thereby justifying searches, detentions, and political trials” (2000, 53).
FRY oppression and police presence in Kosovo continued to escalate, as did the KLA
response. The Commission believes the hostilities finally came to a head and
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exploded into full-on war when, in February of 1998, Serbs arrested Adem Jashari, a
prominent member of the KLA, and in the week after his arrest his extended family
of 58 people was killed. After such a brutal show of force militias began to form in
villages all over Kosovo (2000, 55).
After this point was passed and hostilities continued to escalate the
international community could no longer tolerate inaction. In March, 1998 the
United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1160, in which the Council calls
for an arms embargo on the FRY (including Kosovo), the cessation of hostilities and
terrorist acts, and the political and diplomatic resolution of issues based on the
condemnation of the “use of excessive force by Serbian police forces against
civilians,” and “all acts of terrorism” by the KLA (U. N. Security Council 1998). The
resolution also warns of further action and additional measures by the Council in
the case that there is a, “failure to make constructive progress towards the peaceful
resolution of the situation in Kosovo” (1998, 4). One may note upon reading the
resolution that there is no direct mention of humanitarian abuses or concerns as
reasoning for the embargo, though the “territorial integrity” of the FRY is mentioned
(and is also mentioned in subsequent resolutions). In the following months conflicts
and skirmishes escalated as the Yugoslav government attempted to contain the
fighting and avoid further provocation and increased involvement of international
actors, however their attempts were unsuccessful.
Six months after Resolution 1160, with no apparent end to the fighting in
sight, the Security Council passed Resolution 1199. Resolution 1199 contains bolder
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language and directly references the growing humanitarian crisis in Kosovo. The
resolution states the Council is, “Gravely concerned at the recent intense fighting in
Kosovo and in particular the excessive and indiscriminate use of force by Serbian
security forces and the Yugoslav Army which have resulted in numerous civilian
casualties and, according to the estimate of the Secretary-General, the displacement
of over 230,000 persons from their homes” (U. N. Security Council 1998a, 1). The
Council added “indiscriminate” to their list of adjectives to underscore the
humanitarian element of civilian casualties, the concerns of impending ethnic
cleansing, and the general refugee issue caused by the conflict. The Council also
expressed concern about the “rapid deterioration in the humanitarian situation
throughout Kosovo, […] the impending humanitarian catastrophe,” and “reports of
increasing violations of human rights and of international humanitarian law”
(1998a, 2). Most importantly the resolution also contains direct demands regarding
the humanitarian concerns among their demand for a ceasefire and diplomatic
resolution as opposed to just expressing concerns. The resolution states, “[The
Security Council] Demands also that the authorities of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia and the Kosovo Albanian leadership take immediate steps to improve
the humanitarian situation and to avert the impending humanitarian catastrophe”
(1998a, 2). The humanitarian language in Resolution 1199 is very strong, thus
helping to set Kosovo as a precedent for humanitarian intervention.
The impotency of Resolutions 1160 and 1199 caused the NATO Alliance to
consider military intervention as early as June 1998 (IICK 2000, 72). In a
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circumstance that will remain familiar throughout subsequent analysis of
intervention on RtoP principles NATO got involved because of the fear of a Russian
veto on any resolution authorizing military intervention. The ICISS quotes the
London Times,
Diplomatic sources said yesterday that alliance members were approaching
consensus on the legal basis for airstrikes. Although several countries,
including Greece, Spain, Germany and Italy, had previously favoured seeking
authorization from the United Nations Security Council, they now realized
that was no longer realistic because of Moscow's pledge to veto military
action. (2001a, 110)
Perhaps most frustrating was the fact that Russian officials seemed to be taking
measures to avert continued conflict in Kosovo unilaterally on a diplomatic level but
still frustrated the efforts of the Security Council with veto threats. The IICK notes,
that there were some mixed signals and a “lack of policy coherence” according to the
report as Russia simultaneously engaged in talks with Milosevic and Serbian
officials while opposing action in the Security Council (2000, 144). The Chinese
delegation also felt similar reluctance to legitimize and legalize action in Kosovo
through the Security Council. The IICK report states, “China was also concerned that
the UNSC was subject to manipulation by the United States and its allies, and thus
should not be given any role in extending the Charter limits on the use of force”
(2000, 145). Russia and China feared (and still fear) the status quo created by
Western nations in positions of power within the United Nations. This anti-Western
Russia/China dyad, examined in the previous chapter, is also present in the
subsequent cases presented here, especially Syria.
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The NATO bombing campaign against Yugoslavia began on March 24, 1999,
at 8pm local time. According to the official response the purpose of the operation
was “to demonstrate the seriousness of NATO’s response to aggression, to deter
Milosevic’s escalating attacks in Kosovo, and seriously to damage Yugoslavia’s
military capacity to wage war in the future. The European leaders said about the
same but stressed more strongly that the NATO intervention was necessary to
prevent a humanitarian catastrophe” (IICK 2000, 85). Indeed it seems that
humanitarian concerns were only weakly invoked by a few nations to justify the
interaction. The ICISS Supplementary Volume notes, “In an emergency session of the
Security Council on March 24, Russia, China, Belarus, and India opposed the action
as a violation of the Charter. Of those states that supported the action, few asserted
a clear legal basis for it. The US, Canada, and France stressed that the FRY was in
violation of legal obligations imposed by Resolutions 1199 and 1203. Only the
Netherlands and the UK argued that the action was a legal response to a
‘humanitarian catastrophe’" and was ‘the minimum judged necessary for that
purpose’” (2001a, 112). This reading shows the limited role of humanitarian
concerns leading up to the NATO bombings of the FRY in 1999 despite the strong
wording of the preceding resolutions.
NATO proceeded with their operation without UN permission because they
feared deadlock in the Security Council. This fear was subsequently confirmed when
Russia and China proposed a resolution to declare the action unlawful and halt it
(Henkin 1999, 825). This highlights a number of issues with humanitarian
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intervention and RtoP, mainly the legitimacy issue of unilateral action, and the
seeming necessity to have the ability to circumvent the Security Council. It also
shows the East/West grouping among the permanent members of the Security
Council that still persists today and shows up in the subsequent case studies on
Libya and Syria. Henkin writes, “as Kosovo illustrated, the Council, as presently
constituted and under prevailing procedures, remains seriously defective and may
sometimes be unavailable for that awesome responsibility,” i.e. safeguarding against
the abuse of humanitarian intervention (1999, 827). The composition and inner
working of the Security Council have not changed significantly since the 1999
Kosovo intervention and subsequent resolutions passed, in spite of the efforts and
ideas offered by scholars and diplomats in the previous chapter. The need to be able
to circumvent the Council is also reflected in the RtoP writings, representing the
precedential nature of the campaign.
The involvement of the international community and commencement of
NATO bombings coincided with increased ethnic cleansing, displacement, and other
humanitarian abuses by the FRY. According to the report the FRY began their ethnic
cleansing, which they insisted was purely a military operation, in response to
international involvement, but was not clearly “provoked” by said involvement. The
FRY “blamed all human rights violations, especially the forced displacement of
Kosovar Albanians, on NATO and the KLA” (IICK 2000, 88). With regards to these
humanitarian abuses, the IICK reports, “In the period March 24, 1999 to June 19,
1999, the Commission estimates the number of killings in the neighborhood of
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10,000, with the vast majority of the victims being Kosovar Albanians killed by fry
forces” (2000, 2) and hundreds of thousands more were displaced. There were also
many concerns about the effectiveness of the NATO operation itself. President
Clinton expressly stated that the US government, as a part of the NATO Alliance,
“had no intention of deploying ground troops to fight a war” (IICK 2000, 85). Coady
refers to this as “cost-free intervention,” believing that the refusal to put troops in
harm’s way “leads to the reliance upon remote forms of air power and technological
wizardry that tend to shift the damage onto the largely blameless civilian
populations, as happened to some degree in the bombing of Serbia” (2008, 95). The
cost in casualties is thereby displaced onto civilian populations from the intervening
army, in this case NATO forces. This allows the criticism that NATO was undercommitted to the operation in Kosovo and unwilling to risk casualties to prevent
humanitarian catastrophe.
After an extended bombing campaign by the NATO Alliance the United
Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1244 on June 10, 1999 which essentially
legitimized the unilateral operation post hoc. Resolution 1244 directly references
the “humanitarian tragedy,” and the Council writes that they are, “Determined to
resolve the grave humanitarian situation in Kosovo, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,
and to provide for the safe and free return of all refugees and displaced persons to
their homes” (U. N. Security Council 1999, 1). In order to achieve these ends the
Council set up UN peacekeeping forces to maintain and monitor relations between
the FRY and Kosovo, demilitarize the KLA, monitor borders, allow for humanitarian
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aid to be administered, and address the refugee issue after a “verifiable phased
withdrawal from Kosovo” by FRY forces. By passing Resolution 1244 the Council
essentially legitimized the NATO intervention and officially intervened in Kosovo. As
part of their rebuilding effort the Council set up what they call an “interim
administration” to establish Kosovo’s essential self-government and autonomy,
begin reconstruction, establish the rule of law, protect and promote human rights,
and “[organize] and [oversee] the development of provisional institutions for
democratic and autonomous self-government pending a political settlement,
including the holding of elections” (U. N. Security Council 1999, 4). The list provided
in the Resolution does strongly resemble the Rebuilding sections of the subsequent
ICISS document on the Responsibility to Protect. The Kosovo operation may have
served as a template for the rebuilding portion of RtoP.
It is important here to touch once again on the norm of sovereignty.
Throughout the Security Council resolutions on Kosovo the Council continue to
reaffirm the sovereignty of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia somewhere within
the text. It is of interest to note that sovereignty is continually reaffirmed regardless
of the content of the resolution itself, i.e. it seems more like lip service to the norm of
sovereignty than any actual application or adherence to it. The bulk of Resolution
1199 in particular describes very specific and intrusive policy initiatives and goals
for the Serbian government, including ceasing repression of resistance, allowing
observers and aid, and establishing a timetable for resolution. Kohen and Del Mar
note,
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The guarantees of respect of the territorial integrity of Serbia were expressly
mentioned by members of the UNSC, both immediately preceding and
following the adoption of UNSCR 1244. Indeed, a guarantee of the respect for
the territorial integrity of Serbia was a conditio sine qua non for China to
allow UNSCR 1244 to be adopted by abstaining during the voting process.
(2011, 124)
In spite of these promises and what I refer to as lip service to the norm of
sovereignty, the United Nations essentially condones and assists in secession within
the territory of another country. This shows also how Kosovo may serve as a
negative precedent as well as a positive one, at least with respect to the sovereignty
norm. It also shows where the ICISS derived their argument of an evolved norm of
sovereignty. One gets the sense from the IICK report and the relevant Security
Council resolutions that the relevant actors involved view Kosovo less as a case of
violation of sovereignty and more how a legitimate humanitarian intervention was
carried out. In short, the situation required intervention, and the traditional concept
of sovereignty, though given lip service, is essentially forfeited. As shown in
previous chapters this issue persists throughout the evolution of RtoP.
The Independent International Commission on Kosovo concludes their
chapter on International Law and Humanitarian Intervention by outlining a number
of “threshold principles” for humanitarian intervention taken from the lessons of
the NATO intervention in Kosovo. They state that there are two valid triggers,
“severe violations of international human rights or humanitarian law on a sustained
basis,” and “the subjection of a civilian society to great suffering and risk due to the
“failure” of their state, which entails the breakdown of governance at the level of the
territorial sovereign state” (IICK 2000, 193). They also stipulate that the primary
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goal of any humanitarian intervention should be, “direct protection of the victimized
population,” and that the operation must have reasonable chances of success, i.e. the
operation must contribute directly to ending the catastrophe and be able to do so
without incurring further unnecessary harm to civilian populations (IICK 2000,
194). The Commission goes on to state a number of contextual principles that
include serious attempts at solutions falling short of military intervention, possible
exercise of the Uniting for Peace mechanisms within the United Nations, strict
adherence to the laws of war, and so on. In short, the Commission outlines most of
the principles that end up comprising the content of the Responsibility to Protect.
The Commission correctly points out that the case of Kosovo is less a
positive, precedent-setting example of successful humanitarian intervention, and
more a case that exposes the problems inherent in international system with
regards to humanitarian intervention at the time of its writing in 2000. The NATO
intervention,
exposed the limitations of the current international law on the balance
between the rights of citizens and the rights of states; it demonstrated the
difficulties that ensue when even the most sophisticated and professional
military forces are deployed to achieve humanitarian goals; it showed, in the
un administration’s difficulties in Kosovo, the immense obstacles that lie in
the path of creating multi-ethnic cooperation in societies torn apart by ethnic
war. (IICK 2000, 297)
The evolution of RtoP is an attempt to respond to and address these problems. The
following passage from the conclusion of the 2000 Kosovo Report seems to be the
seed of Responsibility to Protect thought and logic taken from the lessons learned in
Kosovo;
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While the sovereignty of states is an essential element of human rights
protection itself, sovereignty is frequently abused as a cover and justification
both for abuse and for non-compliance with international norms. What is
urgently needed is a code of citizenship for nations, which both protects
states against unwarranted interference from outside powers, and
guarantees their inhabitants remedies when their human rights are
systematically abused. This ultimately implies changing the ‘default setting’
of the UN Charter, revising the so-called inviolability of sovereign states so
that sovereignty becomes conditional on observance of certain minimal but
universal and clear standards of behavior. (IICK, 291)
All of the aspects of RtoP are contained in this statement by the Independent
International Commission on Kosovo. They directly address prevailing sovereignty
norms and a wish to respect yet overcome them for humanitarian purposes, and the
“certain minimal but universal and clear standards of behavior,” and “code of
citizenship for nations” are direct precursors to the Responsibility to Protect.
Falk writes, “In sum, unfortunately, the NATO initiative on behalf of Kosovo
offers us a badly flawed precedent for evaluating future claims to undertake
humanitarian intervention without proper UN authorization” (1999, 856). Kosovo
shows us the importance of relying on the UN for legitimacy and legality, both
cornerstones of the majority of scholarly opinion on RtoP. Most importantly, if
nothing else, the issues raised in Kosovo spark important discussion and debate
about bridging the gap between legitimacy and legality when it comes to
humanitarian intervention. Brunée and Toope write, “Kosovo raised again the
fundamental questions whether or not a norm of humanitarian intervention existed
and, if so, who could invoke it, only the Security Council or individual states?” (2010,
62). Bellamy (2008) also argues that Kosovo is an important case study for
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highlighting the discussion on just cause criteria and thresholds, i.e. when is
intervention necessary, legal, and legitimate. Kosovo forced world leaders and
international organizations to confront the issue of humanitarian intervention and
necessitated a discussion about intervention but it is thereby not precisely an
example of its failure, especially since it was carried out unilaterally outside of the
United Nations. If anything it is an example of why the discussion needs or needed
to occur.
International legal scholar Louis Henkin believes that there is not a clear or
conclusive hierarchy of norms or legal principles at the time of the Kosovo War.
Henkin writes,
The principles of law, and the interpretations of the Charter, that prohibit
unilateral humanitarian intervention do not reflect a conclusion that the
"sovereignty" of the target state stands higher in the scale of values of
contemporary international society than the human rights of its inhabitants
to be protected from genocide and massive crimes against humanity. (1999,
824-5).
According to this formulation intervention and sovereignty are both international
values and it is not clear that one necessarily stands above the other, though there is
certainly more legal basis for the latter. What the subsequent country case studies
show, however, is that humanitarian justifications are often unclear and not
uniformly applicable, especially because they require specific action as permissive
norms as opposed to sovereignty which is prohibitive in nature. The sovereignty
norm is more fairly and accurately adhered to, whereas intervention relies on the
whims of the actors carrying out the intervention. This difficulty revealed by the
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international experiences in Kosovo necessitates the development of collective
means of intervention.
The final principles of humanitarian intervention put forth by the IICK in
light of the events in Kosovo are clearly a precursor to the Responsibility to Protect
and the subsequent principles presented by the ICISS in 2001. They consist of three
threshold principles and eight more contextual principles. The valid triggers are
“severe violations of international human rights or humanitarian law on a sustained
basis,” and “the subjection of a civilian society to great suffering and risk due to the
‘failure’ of their state, which entails the breakdown of governance at the level of the
territorial sovereign state” (IICK 2000, 293). The second trigger is especially
reminiscent of RtoP insofar as states being unable or unwilling to fulfill their
sovereign duty to protect their population. The other two threshold principles
essentially state that the primary purpose for intervention must be humanitarian
(just cause principle), and that prevention or ceasing of humanitarian catastrophe
must be feasible (reasonable chances of success principle). The contextual
principles essentially foreshadow the prevention and rebuilding aspects of the
intervention, with particular stress on the legitimate efforts to prevent abuses such
as sanctions, diplomatic talks, and other peaceful solutions, as well as other Just War
principles (IICK 2000, 293-4). The lessons learned from the Kosovo War as reflected
by the Independent International Commission on Kosovo clearly foreshadow the
eventual formulation of the Responsibility to Protect.
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Libya
Many scholars, international relations theorists, and UN officials regard the
multilateral UN sanctioned action in Libya to be a clear victory for RtoP and a good
example of its application to a specific situation. Edward Luck (2011) refers to the
Libyan intervention as the first explicit invocation of RtoP in a Chapter VII context.
Libya is also the first real practical application of RtoP since the lessons learned
from Kosovo in 1999, thereby allowing us to analyze how the norm has evolved in
the subsequent years and whether the lessons learned are properly applied. This
section turns a critical eye upon the UN sanctioned NATO intervention in Libya to
provide a comprehensive and in-depth understanding of how RtoP’s application
therein affects and reflects its normative development.
Protests against Muammar Qaddafi’s allegedly oppressive and tyrannical rule
in Libya began in February 2011. During the ensuing days of protest the Libyan
security forces under the command of “Brother Leader” Muammar Qaddafi
reportedly killed at least 109 protestors (Eckert 2012). Five days after the onset of
protests on February 17, Qaddafi made a public statement against the protests in
which he pledged to, “purge Libya inch by inch, room by room, household by
household, alley by alley, and individual by individual until the country is purified”
(Amnesty International 2011, 16). Such violent, inflammatory rhetoric by a leader
towards their own population did not escape the notice of the international
community. In a welcome change from the prolonged inaction of the international

96
community in Kosovo that allowed the conflict to worsen, the United Nations
Security Council was able to initiate discussion and action in Libya.
On the 26th of February the Security Council passed Resolution 1970, in
which they “recall” the Libyan authorities’ responsibility to protect its population
and demand an immediate end to the violence (U. N. Security Council 2011). The
humanitarian language in Resolution 1970 is fairly strong and, indeed, more
expansive in some ways than Resolution 1199 on Kosovo. The Council “condemns”
and “[deplores] the gross and systematic violation of human rights” committed by
the Libyan government upon civilians, expresses concern about the refugee issues
created by the conflict, and welcomes further investigation into the alleged
violations of international human rights law (U. N. Security Council 2011, 1). These
phrases are not particularly unusual or unlike the Kosovo resolutions. However, the
Council includes as a gross and systematic violation of human rights, “the repression
of peaceful demonstrators,” and “the incitement to hostility and violence” (U. N.
Security Council 2011, 1). Perhaps in their fervor to properly apply their first case of
RtoP the Council hastily set the threshold incredibly low. The repression of peaceful
demonstrators, though unfortunate and regretful, is not an established violation of
international human rights law. Under Chapter VII the Council calls for an end to the
violence, restraint on the part of the Libyan government, an ICC referral, arms
embargo, and other sanctions against Libyan officials. As with the Council’s
resolutions on Kosovo they pay lip service to the sovereignty, independence,
territorial integrity and national unity of Libya. Another very important part of
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Resolution 1970 is the inclusion of condemnations by Libya’s regional neighbors,
the Arab League, the African Union, and Secretary General of the Organization of the
Islamic Conference. The regional support for the Security Council resolutions on
Libya was a vital part of its acceptance and a very indicator of multilateralism and,
therefore, legitimacy.
Resolution 1970 did not lead to the immediate cessation of violence,
therefore the Security Council passed Resolution 1973 on March 17, 2011, in which
they reiterate the first pillar of the responsibility to protect8 and establish a No-Fly
Zone and reinforces arms embargo and other sanctions from Resolution 1970 (U. N.
Security Council 2011a). Perhaps realizing that the legitimacy of their RtoP
thresholds were at stake the Council’s language on humanitarian abuses is a bit
stricter in Resolution 1973. They continue to condemn humanitarian abuses,
however their examples are more in line with more well-established triggers,
including torture, executions, and enforced disappearances. The Council’s language
regarding the alleged abuses is also less succinct, allowing for a fair amount of
interpretive leeway. In their reasoning the Security Council states, “Considering that
the widespread and systematic attacks currently taking place in the Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya against the civilian population may amount to crimes against humanity
[emphasis mine]” (U. N. Security Council 2011a, 1). Resolution 1973 takes a step
back from the fairly strong, low-threshold humanitarian language and focuses on
“Reiterating the responsibility of the Libyan authorities to protect the Libyan
population and reaffirming that parties to armed conflicts bear the primary
responsibility to take all feasible steps to ensure the protection of civilians” (U. N.
Security Council 2011a, 1).
8
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the role of the Security Council in addressing threats to international peace and
security. The significance of Resolution 1973 should not be taken lightly, however.
Since the Kosovo air campaign had been carried out by the NATO Alliance prior to
the post hoc legitimization by the Security Council, Libya marks the first legitimate
assertion of RtoP principles. As Morris notes, “In passing Resolution 1973 […] the
UN mandated, for the first time in its history, military intervention in a sovereign
state against the express will of that state’s government” (2013, 1271). Within two
days of Resolution 1973 NATO forces began bombing Libya’s air defenses,
effectively leveling the playing field between government and opposition forces.
This allowed the rebel forces to seize control of the Tripoli, the Libyan capital, in
August and effectively end the rebellion. Qaddafi was killed by opposition forces in
October 2011.
Alex Bellamy is one who cites the Libyan intervention as a positive example
of RtoP enforcement. He writes, “the signs from Libya suggest that the
establishment of modest early-warning, assessment, and convening capacities can
have a positive effect on policy planning and decision-making” (Bellamy 2011a,
264). Bellamy’s assessment of the Libyan intervention shows what RtoP is
potentially capable of achieving in a positive way. Bin Halal and Schwarz (2013)
note that the decisively multilateral character of the intervention made it very
successful with respect to the development of the RtoP norm. Thomas Weiss
believes that RtoP in Libya has the opportunity to strengthen the norm, and that
since 2005 normative trends on the invocation of RtoP and humanitarian
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intervention seem to be growing in favor of those norms or policies (Weiss et. al.
2011). The research shows that a large number of scholars regard Libya as a success
for RtoP. When compared to the legitimacy issues and unilateral nature of the
Kosovo War it is hard to disagree. Libya represents a case wherein humanitarian
catastrophe was foreseen and averted, or at the very least rapidly stopped, by direct,
multilateral action through the United Nations. The operation was carried out
swiftly and with purpose. Beyond and underneath these objective indicators,
however, there lies a manifestation of many of the inherent issues of RtoP outlined
in the previous chapters.
Much of the literature cited suggests that pro-RtoP scholars recognize that
RtoP must be adopted by the great powers for the norm to become naturalized,
embedded, and ultimately accepted – this is one of the reasons why many point to
its execution in the Libyan case as a good example of its spreading acceptance.
However, Justin Morris (2013) suggests that scholars and researchers have given
RtoP more credit than perhaps it deserved in the decision making of the UNSC to
intervene, particularly in Libya. Upon analyzing a vast majority of the pro-RtoP
literature, one may draw the conclusion that Libya was a resounding success for the
norm. The Morris article sheds a fair amount of light on this assertion. Germany,
China, India, Brazil, and Russia all expressed concerns over the application of RtoP
in Libya for various but related reasons, and the Resolutions on Libya (1970, 1973,
2016, and 2040) refer only to the first pillar of RtoP (sovereign responsibility)
without making any explicit judgments on the second and third pillars

100
(international responsibility). According to Morris this suggests, “R2P remains
controversial and contested, and subject to a far lesser level of norm-cascade than is
often suggested in scholarly literature” (2013, 1273). Morris’ analysis shows that
the Libyan intervention, even if considered successful, was not an overwhelming
victory for the Responsibility to Protect and further that the pro-RtoP community
may be incorrectly evoking the relative success of the Libyan intervention to show a
positive normative development.
What much of the pro-RtoP literature lacks is the recognition that the Libyan
was especially unique and incredibly specific – it was a case in which the application
of RtoP was relatively uncomplicated for a number of factors not easily duplicated
across all cases. Hehir refers to the occurrence of the Libyan intervention as
“aberrant, albeit welcome, behaviour impelled by a unique constellation of
necessarily temporal factors” (Weiss et. al. 2011, 19). Among these factors are the
relative straightforwardness of the abuses and intent to abuse, the lack of vital,
conflicting state interests, the involvement of regional institutions, and Muammar
Qaddafi’s relative lack of allies either in the region or, most importantly, within the
Security Council. First, the language that Qaddafi used in his pursuit the rebels was
very obviously inflammatory, extreme, and dangerous. Aside from his promise to
“purge” and “purify” Libya of dissent, Bellamy writes, “In words that bore direct
echoes of the 1994 Rwandan genocide, Qadhafi told the world that ‘officers have
been deployed in all tribes and regions so that they can purify all decisions from
these cockroaches’ and ‘any Libyan who takes arms against Libya will be executed’”
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(2011, 838). It is very clear that this kind of language is relatively unusual, thus
inviting the comparison with the Rwandan genocide. Secondly, “the Arab League,
including Libya’s neighbors, endorsed the action—a testament to Qadhafi ’s political
isolation,” and “the governments of Russia and China, often reluctant to support
intervention, chose to abstain rather than veto crucial UN Security Council
resolutions” (Albright and Williamson 2013, 16). In short, Qaddafi’s years of
aberrant and unusual behavior made sure that he had no real allies by the time the
decision to intervene was made, thereby making the decision relatively very easy
politically. Albright and Williamson also note that the operation was relatively easy
militarily, due to “the modest capacity of Libya’s armed forces, the open desert
landscape, and the country’s proximity to Europe and allied military bases aided the
military aspects of the operation” (2013, 16). All of these factors help highlight how
relatively easy the intervention in Libya was politically, militarily, and
diplomatically. The decisive factors that led to intervention in Libya are not likely to
be duplicated across all cases. It may therefore be premature to conclude the
success of RtoP principles based on the Libyan operation if they can only be applied
in the easiest and most obvious cases.
Mohammed Nuruzzaman believes that a critical review of the Libyan
intervention reveals three different ways in which the intervention was injurious to
RtoP; military force was resorted to with incredible swiftness, there was “double
commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity,” and the rebuilding policy
was morally and ethically dubious (2013, 63). The timeframe between the call for
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RtoP and a Security Council Resolution authorizing the use of force was incredibly
short – less than a month all told. Compared to the six month timeframe between
Resolutions 1160 and 1199 and then the subsequent six months from Resolution
1199 to the NATO Alliance campaign in Kosovo the Libyan operation seems
incredibly swift. There were little to no efforts to engage in preventative diplomacy,
talks, etc., all prerequisites for the legitimacy of RtoP as stated by the ICISS in 2001
and many scholars since. With respect to the “double commission of war crimes,”
Nuruzzaman believes that the NATO forces stepped in too quickly and essentially
helped the opposition movement commit their own war crimes as the number of
casualties skyrocketed and the conflict was pushed into a full-blown war (2013, 64).
Lastly, he claims “NATO left Libya after Gaddafi was killed, leaving behind [rebel
forces] plagued with internal divisions and unable to address serious issues of
national reconciliation and unity” (2013, 65). The rebuilding portion of RtoP seems
to missing from the Libyan intervention according to this analysis. The swiftness of
Security Council action in Libya is both refreshing in light of a comparison to the
painfully long periods of inaction in Kosovo, and distressing in light of the positive
normative development of RtoP through practical application.
Clearly there are those who question whether or not Libya was indeed a
success for the Responsibility to Protect. On a purely observational level the
operation was successful in that abuses were prevented/halted and RtoP was
evoked, at least in part, as a major portion of the reasoning for the No-Fly zone and
subsequent NATO military action, much like in Kosovo. Critics point out that the
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inclusion of RtoP in the Security Council resolutions on Libya was more
controversial than other researchers suggests, and that the operation itself was not
carried out in line with RtoP specifications or at the very least that the operation
was far from ideal. At the very least, however, it would not be unfair to conclude that
the experiences in Libya were exponentially better than the NATO experience in
Kosovo more than ten years prior, thus suggesting a positive evolution of the RtoP
norm. The Libyan intervention was undoubtedly a better example of humanitarian
intervention than was the intervention in Kosovo, however this relative
improvement of practical applications does not indicate that the operation was
objectively successful upon a comprehensive analysis. As Morris warns, we must be
cautious not to measure the success of the operation only in comparison to “worse”
examples like Kosovo and thereby risk reaching false conclusions about RtoP’s
normative development.
Syria
If Libya was a success for the Responsibility to Protect the lack of its
successful application in Syria is almost definitely a failure for its proponents. The
disputable success of the Libyan intervention has led a number of observers to
question whether or not RtoP really has been adopted as an international legal
norm, with a number of scholars and international leaders lauding the operation as
a successful example of the norm’s adoption. One of the prerequisites for a concept
to become a norm is its continued and comprehensive application, its compliancepull, and its ability to influence the behavior of states. Once again, we must be
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careful in our assessments and remember that the development of norms is not
linear. This section examines the conflict in Syria and what inaction by the Security
Council says about the current development and status of RtoP as an accepted norm.
The Arab Spring protests had already spread to Syria by March 2011 when a
group of about 200 protestors gathered to demand the resignation of Syrian
President Bashir al-Assad. According to numerous reports, this protest and the ones
that followed were often met with allegedly unnecessary lethal force by Syrian
security forces who are quite numerous and also very loyal to the al-Assad
government (Eckert 2012). Table 1 (Political Will and State Interests) puts the
fatalities in Syria at 1807 in 2011. However, since then the conflict has been
upgraded to a full-on civil war, and the CIA reports the death toll at over 100,000
(CIA 2013), though this number includes Syrian government forces and opposition
forces among the number of civilians killed. Luckily for Assad, he has more allies
within the Security Council than did Qaddafi, and the luck to have his uprising occur
in such close temporal proximity to the Libyan intervention. Both Russia and China
have blocked any meaningful Security Council action on Syria. The situation in Syria
continues to deteriorate and there has yet to be a Security Council resolution
specifically regarding the protection of civilian populations or the responsibility to
protect as of this writing9. The conflict in Syria has persisted for three years without
substantial Security Council involvement.
Security Council Resolution 2118 (United Nations 2013), passed 27 September,
2013, refers specifically to the non-proliferation and prohibition against the use of
chemical weapons, an altogether separate norm. I do not believe it is prudent to
9
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The hypocrisy of this failure to intervene is staggeringly obvious. Shanahan
writes, “those very conditions that were cited as the justification for a military
response under R2P existed in Syria and yet the international community has only
enacted sanctions and issued condemnations” (Weiss, et. al. 2011, 27). Security
Council Resolution 2118, the only resolution issued against Syria at this time, not
only does not mention RtoP (its focus is the chemical weapons ban), it specifically
defends the sovereignty of the Syrian Republic and stresses the need for a Syrian-led
diplomatic solution, i.e. the Syrian government is not determined to be in violation
of their responsibility to protect. The Action Group for Syria, consisting of
Secretaries-General of the United Nations and the League of Arab States, Ban Kimoon and Nabil Elaraby, respectively, the Foreign Ministers of the five permanent
members of the Security Council – China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and
the United States of America – as well as the Turkish Foreign Minister, the High
Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and
the Foreign Ministers of Iraq, as Chair of the Summit of the League of Arab States;
Kuwait, as Chair of the Council of Foreign Ministers of the League of Arab States and
Qatar, as Chair of the Follow-up Committee on Syria of the League of Arab States
(UN News Centre 2012), writes that, “They strongly condemn the continued and
escalating killing, destruction and human rights abuses. They are deeply concerned
at the failure to protect civilians, the intensification of the violence, the potential for
even deeper conflict in the country and the regional dimensions of the problem.”
count this resolution as contributing to the advancement or application of the
Responsibility to Protect.
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However, the very next paragraph states, “The members of the Action Group are
committed to the sovereignty, independence, national unity and territorial integrity
of the Syrian Arab Republic” (United Nations 2013, 9). Though the sovereignty lipservice is not usual, the language in this resolution adheres much more closely to
the traditional concepts of sovereignty than to the redefinition of sovereignty
presented by the Responsibility to Protect.
The Responsibility to Protect has not yet been explicitly invoked in the Syrian
case even though a number of similar factors exist. The only specific reference to
RtoP in Syria comes in the form of a concern expressed by Russia that it may be
abused if applied in Syria;
Russia suggested that the “international community [was] alarmed” by the
prospect that Libya might become “a model for future actions of NATO in
implementing the responsibility to protect.” This is the only explicit
reference to R2P made in the Council so far by either Russia or China in
relation to Syria. (Morris 2013, 1276)
This suggests extreme hesitance to apply RtoP in Syria for a number of reasons. The
Russian representative either does not want RtoP to develop in a positive direction
as a norm and is therefore hesitant to apply it in Syria, or they fear that its continued
application will serve to reflect negatively upon it and thereby delegitimize it. It is
also clear that the Russian representative regards the timing of the proposed Syrian
intervention to be problematic; “Russia insisted to fellow Council members that ‘the
situation in Syria cannot be considered in the Council separately from the Libyan
experience’” (Morris 2013, 1275). Perhaps it was the quick succession of
considerations that worried China and Russia. Seen in light of the relatively quick
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actions in Libya this caution may be understandable. Morris also highlights that
there were concerns expressed about regime change as the primary objective, such
as eventually occurred in Libya.
As explored in the previous section the Libyan intervention was incredibly
unique in character and relatively straightforward. The situation on the ground in
Syria is infinitely more complex and more closely resembles the Kosovo case. Syria
is very religiously and ideologically diverse. The CIA World Factbook (2013) reports
the population is 74% Sunni Muslim (Islam - official), 16% other Muslim, which
includes Alawite and Druze, 10% Christian, and a “tiny” Jewish community spread
throughout the major cities. To make matters worse, the Assad family is Alawite,
and effectively has stayed in power for more than 40 years through their “coalition
of minorities” – it also appears, according to some reports, that the vast majority of
armed rebels are Sunni Muslims (Carpenter 2013). This gives the conflict in Syria a
decidedly ideological angle, which is potentially much more difficult to reconcile
than a political one and arguably more volatile. The demographic and ethnic
composition of Syria and Assad’s minority loyalties are also reminiscent of
Milosevic’s support of Serb minorities in Kosovo. Carpenter (2013) also concludes
that Syria is not only difficult domestically, but serves as a locus for international
geopolitical rivalries as well, both within the Middle East and the West.
Eckert (2012) compares the Syrian and Libyan cases and concludes that the
prioritization of state interests is shown partially in the difference between RtoP
application in Libya and Syria respectively. In Libya the cost of intervention was
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low, not only militarily but politically as well, and in Syria there exists a conflict of
interest among the members of Security Council, thereby making decisive action
problematic. The Syrian case illustrates quite well how state interests shape the
decision to intervene, or even evoke RtoP at all, and how difficult it is to apply RtoP
across all situations that may call for its use. Unlike in Libya there are a myriad of
geopolitical and security interests that intersect in Syria, Assad has allies in the
region and in the Security Council, and he has been less inflammatory and has even
cooperated with international pressures in accordance with Security Council
Resolution 2118 by giving up his stock chemical weapons. Albright and Williamson
sum up the conclusions reached by an examination of the Syrian conflict quite well;
The terrible carnage in Syria illustrates that the international community’s
embrace of R2P is not sufficient, in itself, to prevent a ruthless dictator from
inflicting grievous harm on his own citizens, especially when the permanent
members of the Security Council are divided and external military
intervention is difficult. (2013, 17)
The Syrian case is one that illustrates, in real time, the realization of nearly all of the
concerns and issues explored in the previous chapter. The fact that it also more
closely resembles the experience in Kosovo than the much more recent Libyan
intervention also shows the non-linearity of the normative development taking
place.
There are a number of similarities between the Syrian case and the events
leading up to the NATO intervention in Kosovo explored earlier in the chapter. We
have a populace divided among ideological and ethnic lines, and a leader that is loyal
to, or at the very least protective of, a minority population. There is also the tacit
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support of one or more permanent members of the Security Council and an
ideological and geographical dyad between East and West. The relationship with
Russia and their Chinese allies allows Assad to avert direct international
intervention in a way that Milosevic was not. As the IICK writes, “The internationally
isolated Yugoslav government misjudged the international reaction” (2000, 89).
Assad and his allies are clearly more aware of the international situation and
response – clearly those who wish to test the limits of international humanitarian
law have learned their own lessons from Kosovo and Libya. We see in Syria the
lessons of both Kosovo and Libya exerting pressure. If intervention in Kosovo, a
similar situation, has been justified post hoc by the Security Council why then is this
situation in Syria allowed to continue? This once again illustrates that RtoP is based
more on political concerns than humanitarian ones and is incredibly difficult to
apply equitably.
It is here that we echo Morris’ warning that norms do not always (or perhaps
ever) develop in a linear fashion in international law. Some view the Libyan
intervention as a clear success of RtoP (though there are those who contest even
that conclusion), however the lack of Security Council action in the face of similar
atrocities10 serves to highlight the reality that the evolution of the Responsibility to
Protect can indeed move backwards, and that we should be cautious in lauding its
success before it has earned such commendations or acceptance.

Nuruzzaman refers to the Security Council’s “bizarre indifference to Bahrain and
Yemen” in reference to RtoP’s inconsistent application (2013, 66).
10

110
Chapter 4: Conclusions and Lessons
Introduction
The preceding examination of the Responsibility to Protect and some
relevant case studies leads to the conclusion that the principle is incredibly flawed
in a number of ways and faces many years of continued tension and controversy on
the path ahead. Flawed as its implementation may be the end goal of RtoP is a noble
one and it could be argued that the concept should not be entirely abandoned based
on its relatively short track record. This final chapter addresses some of the positive
developments of RtoP and discusses their importance in moving the norm forward
into the future. This chapter explores some of the potentially most effective
mechanisms for the adoption of RtoP, including the regional and institutional
focuses, as well as how the effectiveness of RtoP is or can be measured in practice.
The discussion continues with a brief look at the position and policy of the United
States, a nation whose normative influence in the international community cannot
be understated. The chapter is capped by a relatively brief conclusion reached
through consideration of all the factors presented in this study.
The Regional Option
The preceding survey of the literature reveals that the successful and
effective application of RtoP may rely in large part upon the cooperation of regional
organizations and nation-states. From the ICISS Document, “Chapter VIII
acknowledges the existence and security role of regional and sub-regional
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organizations, but expressly states that ‘no enforcement action shall be taken under
regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the
Security Council’” (48), and “It has long been acknowledged that neighbouring states
acting within the framework of regional or sub-regional organizations are often (but
not always) better placed to act than the UN, and Article 52 of the Charter has been
interpreted as giving them considerable flexibility in this respect” (53). There are a
number of reasons why a focus on regional organizations helps to solve some of the
conceptual issues inherent in RtoP.
The analyses conducted by Glanville, Bellamy and others of the relatively
effective execution of an RtoP intervention in Libya suggests that the influence of
regional organizations like the League of Arab States was instrumental to amassing
the political will to act. Glanville writes, “in the absence of sovereign consent, this
regional consent was crucial in convincing skeptical states to acquiesce and in
generating the will among other states to push for the authorization of military
intervention to protect civilians” (2013, 336). This regional context can blunt the
image that a given intervention is strongly motivated solely by the interests of
powerful states external to the conflict. Bellamy and Williams refer to these regional
organizations as “gatekeepers” that frame the issues and define the “range of
feasible international action” (2011, 841). They note that up until this point there
was little chance of there being any military action in Libya due to a large amount of
opposition from influential countries, including two P5 members, however the
acceptance of the possibility of intervention by regional actors led the Security
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Council towards consensus (Bellamy and Williams 2011). Furthermore, Bellamy et.
al. assert in the same article that this same “gatekeeper” role was played by regional
organizations leading up the intervention in Côte d’Ivoire. The original ICISS
document similarly speaks to the importance of regional cooperation and provides
Kosovo as a precedent. They write, “As the case of Kosovo demonstrates, it is
essential to strike a balance between the responsibilities of international and local
actors. International actors have the resources to help provide a secure
environment and to begin the reconstruction process” (2001, 45). The conclusions
asserted by Bellamy, Williams, Glanville, and the ICISS suggest that regional
organizations can help to frame the negotiations and discussions leading to
intervention under the Responsibility to Protect by providing important contextual
clarity.
There are those who believe that the role of regional institutions cannot be
overstated. Bellamy’s 2010 study boldly concludes that the League of Arab states
was not only crucial to obtaining the political will in the Security Council to
authorize intervention in Libya but that there never would have been a resolution
without their approval. Bellamy writes,
The Obama administration had been cautious about the prospect of military
action in Libya—because of concerns about military overstretch, potential
casualties, budgetary implications, the potential for mission creep, absence of
a clear exit strategy, and concerns about alienating states in the Middle East
and elsewhere in the Muslim world—but the LAS resolution strengthened
the hand of the interventionists within it. (843)
This course of events is not only interesting in and of itself, but seems to prove
Bellamy’s assertion that regional organizations and nations are incredibly
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influential as gatekeepers in a situation such as the one that occurred in Libya.
Admittedly, the Libyan intervention was a very specific circumstance, however the
situation remains telling. Bellamy’s assertion suggests that a situation in which the
US viewed its interests as being threatened would not have required the
intervention or opinion of a regional organization, but in one like the situation in
Libya where the US arguably could have gone either way, or indeed were leaning
away from intervention, the smaller organization had relative power or sway in the
push towards legitimizing the decision to intervene.
Another reason why this Regional Option is promising is that it helps to
address the issues mentioned earlier that can be associated with attempting to
assert universal moral values through cosmopolitan ideals. Regarding a report
released in 2011 by Ban Ki-Moon, Glanville notes, “The Secretary-General
recognized that the implementation of RtoP ‘should respect institutional and
cultural differences from region to region,’ and he accepted that each region will
operationalize the principle ‘at its own pace and in its own way,’” and “different
regions interpret different norms and values in different ways” (2013, 340). The
observation by Glanville of the Secretary General’s 2011 report shows that the
United Nations as an international body believes that respect for the cultural and
communitarian values of nation-states and regions is an important part of
implementing any policy, especially one as potentially invasive as RtoP. This
approach may help to implement RtoP in a way that is more sensitive to the needs
and values of different communities.
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The Institutional Approach
Institutionalism, another mechanism for enforcing the development of RtoP
as a norm, has a strong presence in the literature alongside the regional option
outlined above. The thesis of this approach is that RtoP will be most effectively
enforced and widely accepted by member states when the institutional mechanisms
for its enforcement are well established in order to facilitate timely and efficient
responses to crises as they occur and lower the costs associated with intervention.
Thakur (Weiss, et. al. 2011) believes that without the development of an
institutional framework for RtoP, responses to atrocities will continue to be ad hoc,
unilateral, divisive, and case-by-case even if RtoP is eventually accepted as a norm –
this is evidenced by a comparison of the interventions in Kosovo, Iraq, and Libya.
Thakur urges us to keep in mind, “Acceptance of the responsibility to protect norm
no more guarantees ‘humanitarian intervention’ than its non-existence had
foreclosed it as a tool of individual and collective statecraft” (2009, 18). This
formulation acknowledges that RtoP does not create any additional obligations and
therefore requires continued assertion, reformulation, and institutionalization.
Ideally, RtoP attempts to address this by creating an institutional framework for
prevention, action, and rebuilding, by involving regional organizations and
neighboring countries, and strengthening systems of early warning.
The existing treaties and conventions regarding genocide, war crimes, etc.
would not be emboldened or added to by a norm such as RtoP. What RtoP can do,
however, is to establish effective frameworks and institutions for response and

115
prevention, making existing legal obligations “more effective” as opposed to trying
to create new ones (Strauss 2010, 54). A constructivist view of this institutional
development is that the norms materialize because of new concepts of interest and
then the institutions eventually make those norms into laws once it is shown that
they can be effectively adopted. It is hoped that, over time, “soft” codes of conduct
may “harden” (Alvarez 2009). Observers like Alex Bellamy (2013) believe that these
codes of conduct are already becoming habitual.
Alex Bellamy (2010) comes to the conclusion that the RtoP norm requires
more advocacy and adoption as official policy, which will not only reduce the
likelihood of future atrocities, but also make potential future atrocities easier to stop
if they do begin because states will have built up institutional and diplomatic
frameworks for dealing with the situations. This will make responding to atrocities
easier, less expensive and less controversial, thereby making political will easier to
attain. In Bellamy’s view RtoP will ultimately be more effective if viewed as a policy
agenda as opposed to some kind of “red flag” meant to generate political will on the
fly. He claims, “RtoP is best employed as a diplomatic tool, or prism, to guide efforts
to stem the tide of mass atrocities, and that it has little utility in terms of generating
additional international political will in response to such episodes” (Bellamy 2010,
166). This is an accurate assessment in light of comparisons of past and present
humanitarian interventions. The assessment highlights the need for and potential
success of a robust institutional framework for RtoP.

116
In their summation the ICISS ties institution building to financial concerns as
well. The Commission believes that, at least with respect to prevention, institution
building is more effective, more efficient, and most importantly much cheaper than
the more ad hoc reactions to atrocities that have been carried out in the past,
specifically citing the intervention in Kosovo (ICISS 2001, 71). Making prevention,
reaction, and rebuilding cheaper provides financial incentive and makes the positive
application of RtoP principles more likely, thereby enhancing its chances for success
in normative development and acceptance. One way to enhance this goal is not only
to create new institutions but to adapt existing ones to the purposes of enforcing
RtoP. The International Criminal Court could potentially be used to streamline and
institutionalize RtoP by being reformed and “empowered” to determine cases of
RtoP violations, subject to certain constraints, which would then be referred to the
Security Council for approval (Contarino and Lucent 2010). Adapting the ICC or ICJ
for RtoP purposes would, however, require the most influential members of the
United Nations Security Council to become signatories to the treaties that recognize
them as legitimate.
Peacebuilding Commission
In order to address both the regional and institutional aspects of the
Responsibility to Protect the Security Council formed the Peacebuilding Commission
(PBC) in 2005 with Resolution 1645. In their reasoning for the establishment of the
PBC the Council specifically refers to the “need for a dedicated institutional
mechanism to address the special needs of countries emerging from conflict
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towards recovery,” and “the important role of regional and subregional
organizations in carrying out post-conflict peacebuilding activities in their regions,
and stressing the need for sustained international support for their efforts and
capacity-building to that end” (U. N. Security Council 2005, 1-2). The language and
tone of the resolution leave a fair amount of room for societal and cultural values,
gradual adoption and acceptance, and community participation. The organization is
even structured to be more representative of the international community; “The
Organizational Committee has a broad geographically representative membership,
including seven members selected by the UN Security Council, seven members
elected by ECOSOC, five based on financial contributions, five based on military
contributions and seven elected by the UN General Assembly” (Lambourne and
Herro 2008, 282). Since democratic deficit is one of the primary concerns of the
legitimacy of the Security Council the form and purpose of the PBC may help to
alleviate some of the issues presented here by using the Regional Option and the
Institutional Approach.
The potential for the PBC to have a positive effect on the adoption of RtoP
moving forward is moderate to high. In their study of why the PBC may work in
addressing the difficulties inherent in humanitarian intervention, Lambourne and
Herro write,
The PBC is mandated to consult with civil society and, although it has shown
a reluctance to make significant progress in this domain in its first year of
operations, it has the potential to institutionalise civil society interactions not
only with the government concerned but also with regional organisations,
UN agencies, the World Bank and IMF, and international and local NGOs. In
this way the UN can act as a bridge between civil society and state and

118
interstate actors with a view to empowering the former and holding the
latter accountable. (2008, 289)
The approach of the PBC contains precisely the kind of ground-up acceptance that
RtoP will require to become a fully-fledged international legal norm. Furthermore,
the structure of the Commission is such that members of the international
community with regional ties can participate in decision making directly related to
their regions, thus satisfying the issues related to regional context. The Security
Council Report states, “Resolution 1645 stipulated that the PBC ‘shall meet in
various configurations’ and that each configuration ‘shall include as members, in
addition to members of the Committee, representatives from the country under
consideration’” (Security Council Report 2013, 4). Ideally these configurations will
help to promote the regional participation and acceptance of RtoP, and provide
more legitimacy to UN operations in this context.
The goal of the Peacebuilding Commission is one that helps address some of
the issues presented and analyzed in the previous chapters; however it remains to
be seen whether or not and to what degree it will be successful in achieving that
goal. To ensure and monitor its effectiveness the PBC undergoes official annual
review. According to the Security Council Report the PBC was initially determined
by the official review committee to be relatively ineffective, lacking obvious
progression towards their stated purpose. They outlined six issues that, if resolved,
would help refocus the PBC, among which were “the imperative of national
ownership” and more field perspective (Security Council Report 2013, 3). As the
Security Council Report states, “A field perspective was particularly important,
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according to the report, since it would bring a number of issues into relief, in
particular: national ownership in the planning process and capacity-building;
developmental aspects of peacebuilding; the need for coherence and coordination;
and the importance of the regional dimension” (2013, 3). Addressing these issues
effectively is vital to the working of the PBC, especially insofar as it relates to
resolving the most important issues examined here.
The Security Council Report states that the PBC’s biggest impacts across all
cases (Sierra Leone, Burundi, Guinea-Bissau, Central African Republic, Liberia, and
Guinea) have come largely in the form of resource mobilization and advocacy. The
relationship between the PBC and the Security Council seems to be vital to the PBC’s
effectiveness overall. As yet the PBC seems to have taken more of an advisory role to
the Security Council, but the direct impact is less clear (Security Council Report
2013, 7). If the Security Council avails themselves of the assistance of the PBC in
applying RtoP principles it could turn out to be an important tool of institutional
change and the evolution of the norm going forward. In this sense the PBC could
serve the purpose of making RtoP more palatable and culturally sensitive over time
– whether or not this initiative is ultimately carried out remains to be seen, though
initial reports of the Commission’s effectiveness are not incredibly promising in this
regard. The Peacebuilding Commission certainly has the potential to facilitate the
acceptance of RtoP and the most beneficial routes to its fair and legitimate
application. Although its role seems to be largely advisory so far, this role may
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contribute greatly to affecting real, lasting organizational change within the UN
given that they continue to progress towards their goals.
Measuring Effectiveness
How do we judge the success of a policy like the Responsibility to Protect?
One of the ways to measure the success or failure of RtoP is to analyze the outcome
of operations based on its invocation, such as has been done here in the cases of
Libya and Syria. Though instructive, there are those believe that there are more
accurate ways to measure the success of a norm in its developmental stages as its
acceptance continues to oscillate. This sentiment is echoed by Badescu and
Bergholm who believe,” the appraisal of the responsibility to protect should not be
reduced to the question of the effectiveness of a military response” (306). This
section addresses some of the ways that we may effectively measure the “success” of
the Responsibility to Protect within and outside of a military response.
As previously stated, the Responsibility to Protect is a political issue. We
must, therefore, measure its success not only in terms of its actual outcomes, but
also in how those outcomes appear or are represented. Edward Luck reminds us;
Whatever progress is being made in terms of structural and operational
prevention, the headlines will focus on whether the invocation of the
responsibility to protect and the application of related policy measures can,
in all cases, stop those national leaders who are determined to be at war with
their own people. (2011, 8)
Conversely, Luck believes R2P should be judged not on stopping all of the abovemention cases, but on its ability to meet two outcome goals; 1) the successful
prevention of large scale atrocities like Rwanda, and 2) timely and effective
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reactions in the unfortunate cases where prevention fails. Successful prevention is
difficult to measure, as we have seen. Timely and effective reactions are easier, but
that boils the success of RtoP down to military intervention once again.
Furthermore, measuring success requires that we carefully manage our
expectations of what the Responsibility to Protect can and should achieve. There are
those who believe that the expectations of RtoP interventions are inflated and that
this may lead to continued disappointment (De Waal 2007). This may be due, in
part, to the indeterminacy issue – it is not entirely clear in all cases exactly what it is
that RtoP is trying to achieve and by what means. It may also be due to the political
and practical difficulties of measuring the potential success of prevention.
One of the major barriers to assessing the effectiveness of RtoP is its
inconsistent application over time across various cases. The examination of the
Libyan and Syrian cases shows this difficulty. According to Shanahan, ”The problem
with the real-world invocation of R2P is that those political leaders quickest to
justify military action based on the principle never explain why they don’t call for it
in apparently similar circumstances” (Weiss, et. al. 2011, 27). Perhaps this requires
that the Security Council address not only their justifications for enacting RtoP as in
Libya, but also provide explanations and justifications for inaction, as in the Syrian
case. There may be a place for addressing the differences as opposed to just
avoiding explanation.
In the end, measuring the effectiveness of RtoP requires reconciliation of
most if not all of the issues explored in Chapter 2. It requires that we focus our
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attention on more than just Chapter VII enforcement through and by the Security
Council. It requires that we be crystal clear about what is expected of RtoP and how
it is carried out operationally and conceptually, i.e. a more determinate, specific
framework. It requires that the international community accept the ICISS premise
that the concept of sovereignty has changed to allow these interventions, and that
the international community has been assuaged of their fears of the potential abuse
of intervention. It also requires that we address and resolve the norm conflict
between sovereignty and intervention. Measuring the success of RtoP will require
an examination of how it resolves all of these issues, not merely how it carries out
military operations.
United States Position and Policy
A number of prominent international relations scholars correctly believe that
the role of the United States will be “pivotal” in the acceptance of the Responsibility
to Protect as a norm both abroad in the United Nations and domestically in each
member state (Albright and Williamson 2013, Weiss 2004). The United States is not
only a member of the Security Council Permanent 5 but exerts significant cultural,
economic, political, and diplomatic pressure upon the entire of the international
community. As Weiss writes, “If military intervention to protect human beings is
desirable, the critical task is to engage the United States in multilateral efforts”
(2004, 146). This section examines the importance of the United States as an
international actor and “norm legitimator,” and analyzes the current US position and
policy towards the Responsibility to Protect.
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The United States has the political, economic, and military power to create
the institutions that will be crucial for the effective application of RtoP principles
that lead to its acceptance. The United States is the only member-state to reach the
ceiling rate of 22% for contributions, which is more than twice the percentage of the
next highest contributing member-state as of February 2013 (Japan: 10.833%) (U.
N. General Assembly 2013). Similarly, as the world’s most predominant military
force the United States would have to bear a “disproportionate” financial and
military burden of any international commitments in the name of RtoP (Groves
2008). Bellamy refers to the United States and the United Kingdom as “norm
carriers” (2005, 39). That is to say that it would undoubtedly be nigh impossible to
posit the acceptance of an international norm if the United States and its allies did
not agree to such or abide by the norm’s constraints, at least for the foreseeable
future.
Analysis suggests that the United States will not to pre-commit themselves to
a intervention or allow themselves to be obligated to intervene (Bellamy 2005). The
US policy position is reflected also in their initial reservations to Security Council
Resolution 1674 and the 2005 Outcome Document. Conservative pundits like Steven
Groves agree with this approach, stating that RtoP “is inconsistent with a proper
exercise of sovereignty, and any adoption of its principles is likely to constrain U.S.
action in future situations” (2011, 1). This tendency makes it difficult to outline
reliable and effective triggers for the Responsibility to Protect and any potential
obligation to act.
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This relates closely to the political will issue. Albright and Williamson
provide the following analysis;
Americans have a strong desire to help people in danger overseas; however,
that sentiment is tempered by a fear of yielding control over decisions to
multilateral organizations and becoming enmeshed in places where our
engagement distracts from other priorities, is unsuccessful or
underappreciated, or where costs exceed benefits. (2013, 20).
There is general agreement that American citizens, and especially American
statesmen, regard their political autonomy in the international security arena to be
a concern of the utmost importance. Anything that threatens that autonomy is not
likely to be met favorably. This is reflected also in their unwillingness to sign some
of the major treaties in international law. As Groves reminds us, “the United States
has ratified neither the statute of the International Criminal Court nor the Additional
Protocols on international humanitarian law” (2, 2008).
In regards to the Libyan intervention, Morris notes, “President Obama went
to great lengths to publicly justify the action in terms of case-speciﬁc circumstances”
(Morris 2013, 1274). Libya also shows that the United States acts according to their
own interests and not according to international legal interests in the same way. In
his speech on the intervention in Libya, President Barack Obama is careful to state
that the United States must always measure their interests against any calls for
action, and states that there is an important strategic interest present as well
(Obama 2011). Whatever the reason for these justifications, this suggests that the
Obama administration did not want to present the intervention in the context of the
Responsibility to Protect. The United States government is clearly cautious about
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evoking the Responsibility to Protect, though most likely for different reasons than
Russia and China.
Engaging the United States in the Responsibility to Protect will be difficult
but necessary as long as they hold the position of relative power they currently do.
This would require the United States to agree to potentially constrain their own
activities or be obligated to act abroad. It would also ideally require their ratification
of the Rome Statute and the Additional Protocols. Along with the institutional and
regional options outlined in this chapter, the acceptance of the United States is
critical in advancing the goals of the Responsibility to Protect.
Conclusion
In the preceding work I have presented a comprehensive analysis of the
Responsibility to Protect. I began by establishing a theoretical and conceptual
framework of international law, upon which to build a healthy understanding of the
issues that RtoP presents to that framework and vice-versa. The second chapter
explored the practical limitations of those issues as they are expressed in
accordance to the frames given in the first chapter. Without an understanding of the
communitarian theoretical perspective and its conflict with the cosmopolitan
perspective it would not be possible to understand the impacts of applying the
Prevention portion of the Responsibility to Protect. An understanding of the legal
implications of RtoP is deepened by the theories elucidates in the previous chapter.
The third chapter provided three case studies that examined how RtoP began and
how it has since been applied. The examination of the Kosovo case showed the roots
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of the Responsibility to Protect, and the cases of Libya and Syria exhibited how its
evolution continues as is shown through relevant Security Council resolutions. This
fourth and final chapter collected some of the lessons learned from the examination
of the theoretical, legal, and practical issues of RtoP and presented them for
consideration.
The International Commission, international legal scholars, and members of
the United Nations are attempting to justify RtoP and facilitate its adoption by using
a top-down approach, i.e. applying universal morality and logic through an
international organization like the United Nations. As explored previously, making
such assumptions about the legitimacy of a particular morality is problematic for a
wide variety of reasons. Instead, proponents of the Responsibility to Protect should
be focusing their attempts at the bottom-most layers of acceptance. The necessity
for this bottom-up approach is shown by the exploration of the central issues
conducted in Chapter Two. Many states and international legal scholars rightly
resent the imposition of a particularly Western morality upon them and their
policies. The good news is that this may not be necessary. The feasibility of the
“bottom-up” approach is shown through the Regional and Institutional options
outlined in this chapter. These two options respect the values and goals of nations
who voices are often not well-heard in international organizations like the United
Nations where there is a clear power dynamic expressed largely, but not solely, by
the Security Council veto. The institutional approach attempts to strengthen the
legitimacy of the institutions responsible for RtoP and the regional option extends
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respect and understanding to the smaller nations participating in the organization
who are often the ones most strongly affected by its actions. These efforts in tandem
frame the Responsibility to Protect more as a grassroots operation than forced or
coercive imposition, a much more communitarian approach than is currently being
attempted to the detriment of both RtoP and people upon which the concept is being
forced.
It may come to pass that these approaches will not work, or that RtoP is
doomed to fail to become a norm, or that it will remain forever in a state bordering
on acceptance, or perhaps even that the global power centers will shift towards a
different status quo and change the discussion altogether. Regardless, I believe this
work presents a valid understanding of the concept followed by some potential
steps that may further it. The critical examination of RtoP is not to question its
validity and discard it, but rather to reveal its problems in order to more accurate
address them. As the norm continues to evolve it remains to be seen which portions
of RtoP remain and which are changed or discarded. The prevention of genocide,
crimes against humanity, and purposeless human suffering deserves a critical eye
and fair examination. The cost of forcing such an ideal before it is ready is not to be
underestimated.
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